Discussion Papers, Policy Papers, Books & Reports, Bulletin, Newsletter, Economic Policy Lunchtime Meetings, Workshops & Conferences, Events Diary, Previous Events Programme Areas, Current Research Projects, Networks, Vacancies Programme Directors, Researchers Lists, Noticeboard Press Releases, Coverage, Request a Press Release Data?, Resources for Economists, Data on Other sites Membership information Login, Create a Profile, Profile Benefits, Your Profile Settings, Forgot Your Password? Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback How to find us, Frequently Asked Questions, ESRC Site Guide, Frequently Asked Questions, Vacancies, How to Search Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback CEPR Home Page You have items in your shopping cart.  Click to view your cart
Google


DP6726 The Role of Contracting Schemes for Assessing the Welfare Costs of Nominal Rigidities

Author(s): Matthias Paustian , Jürgen von Hagen
Publication Date: February 2008
Keyword(s): Calvo Pricing , Monetary Policy Rules , Nominal Rigidities , Sticky Information , Taylor Contracts
JEL(s): E32 , E52
Programme Areas: International Macroeconomics
Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6726.asp.asp


Due to the lack of pertinent evidence, there is currently no agreement on how to introduce nominal rigidities into monetary macroeconomic models. We examine the role of alternative assumptions about the wage and price setting mechanisms for the assessment of the welfare costs of nominal rigidities and the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in an otherwise standard New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We find that the choice of a particular price and wage setting scheme matters quantitatively for the welfare costs of nominal rigidities. However, qualitative statements such as the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules are robust to changes in contracting schemes. The difference between sticky nominal contracts and sticky information matters more than the difference in the age distribution of prices wages and information implied by alternative price and wage setting schemes.


Full text Search:
Enter a DP Number:

Access other features of the site by loging in with your personal profile. Purchase a copy of the paper in PDF format. Purchase a printed copy of the paper. How to subscribe to the CEPR Discussion Paper series Send an email to a colleague with details of the paper. Obtain Plain Text details of this paper which you can copy in to a word document or email allowing you to easily cite this paper! Help in purchasing and downloading papers. CEPR RSS feeds information page.

Your current location: Publications > Discussion Papers
Top CEPR, 53-56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
United Kingdom.
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801     Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820
Email: cepr@cepr.org     Webmaster: webmaster@cepr.org
Home
With the support of the European Union: Support for bodies active at European level in the field of active European citizenship