DP6349 Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Author(s): Paolo Buccirossi , Giancarlo Spagnolo

Publication Date: June 2007

Keyword(s): Antitrust , Amnesty , Cartels , CEO compensation , Collusion , Corruption , Corporate crime , Corporate fraud , Corporate governance , Corporate liability , Deterrence , Fines , Employee liability , Leniency , Immunity , Imprisonment , Indemnification , Judgement proofness , Managerial incentives , Optimal sanctions , Rewards , Whistleblowers

JEL(s): G30 , K00 , L20 , L40

Programme Areas: Financial Economics , Industrial Organization

Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6349.asp.asp

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.