DP4736 Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror

Author(s): Raphael Franck , Arye L. Hillman , Miriam Krausz

Publication Date: November 2004

Keyword(s): Defense economics , defensive preemption , counter-terrorism , terror , international judges , profiling

JEL(s): D81 , H56

Programme Areas: Public Policy

Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4736.asp

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population’s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.