Discussion Papers, Policy Papers, Books & Reports, Bulletin, Newsletter, Economic Policy Lunchtime Meetings, Workshops & Conferences, Events Diary, Previous Events Programme Areas, Current Research Projects, Networks, Vacancies Programme Directors, Researchers Lists, Noticeboard Press Releases, Coverage, Request a Press Release Data?, Resources for Economists, Data on Other sites Membership information Login, Create a Profile, Profile Benefits, Your Profile Settings, Forgot Your Password? Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback How to find us, Frequently Asked Questions, ESRC Site Guide, Frequently Asked Questions, Vacancies, How to Search Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback CEPR Home Page You have items in your shopping cart.  Click to view your cart
Google


DP5585 Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data

Author(s): Yuriy Gorodnichenko , Klara Sabirianova
Publication Date: March 2006
Keyword(s): wage , wage differentials , public sector , corruption , bribery , Ukraine
JEL(s): J3 , J4 , O1 , P2
Programme Areas: Institutions and Economic Performance , Labour Economics
Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5585.asp


This study is the first to provide a systematic measure of bribery using micro-level data on reported earnings, household spending and asset holdings. We use the compensating differential framework and the estimated sectoral gap in reported earnings and expenditures to identify the size of unobserved (unofficial) compensation (i.e., bribes) of public sector employees. In the case of Ukraine, we find that public sector employees receive 24-32% less wages than their private sector counterparts. The gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution. At the same time, workers in both sectors have essentially identical level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings that unambiguously indicate the presence of non-reported compensation in the public sector. Using the conditions of labour market equilibrium, we develop an aggregate measure of bribery and find that the lower bound estimate of the extent of bribery in Ukraine is between 460m and 580m U.S. dollars (0.9-1.2% of Ukraine’s GDP in 2003).


Full text Search:
Enter a DP Number:

Access other features of the site by loging in with your personal profile. Purchase a copy of the paper in PDF format. Purchase a printed copy of the paper. How to subscribe to the CEPR Discussion Paper series Send an email to a colleague with details of the paper. Obtain Plain Text details of this paper which you can copy in to a word document or email allowing you to easily cite this paper! Help in purchasing and downloading papers. CEPR RSS feeds information page.

Your current location: Publications > Discussion Papers
Top CEPR, 53-56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
United Kingdom.
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801     Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820
Email: cepr@cepr.org     Webmaster: webmaster@cepr.org
Home
With the support of the European Union: Support for bodies active at European level in the field of active European citizenship