Discussion Papers, Policy Papers, Books & Reports, Bulletin, Newsletter, Economic Policy Lunchtime Meetings, Workshops & Conferences, Events Diary, Previous Events Programme Areas, Current Research Projects, Networks, Vacancies Programme Directors, Researchers Lists, Noticeboard Press Releases, Coverage, Request a Press Release Data?, Resources for Economists, Data on Other sites Membership information Login, Create a Profile, Profile Benefits, Your Profile Settings, Forgot Your Password? Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback How to find us, Frequently Asked Questions, ESRC Site Guide, Frequently Asked Questions, Vacancies, How to Search Site Map, How to find us, How to Order Publications, Privacy Policy, Feedback CEPR Home Page You have items in your shopping cart.  Click to view your cart

Independent and Accountable: A New Mandate for the Bank of England

Zoom In

Author(s): David Begg , Terence C Daintith , Leonhard Gleske , Charles A Goodhart , Philippe Lagayette , Peter Middleton , Mario Monti , Richard Portes , Eric Roll of Ipsden , David Walker , Charles Wyplosz

Publication Date: 01 November 1993

ISBN: 1 898128 02 2
Hard Copy Price: £15.00

Link to this page:
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/books/P050.asp

Send an email to a colleague with details of the Report Send an email to a colleague with details of the Report

Summary: This report is of a panel of experts, chaired by Eric Roll, which examined proposals for changing the Bank of England’s mandate and its relationship with the Treasury. It comes out strongly in favour of a central bank free to set monetary policy; pursuing only price stability without Treasury control. Taking independence measures enacted since 1993 to their logical conclusion, it argues for the following:
(1) Price stability to be the sole statutory objective of the Bank, which formulates and announces a medium-term target for inflation and controls short-term interest rates to achieve it.
(2) The Bank has full control of interest rates. Given interest rates, foreign exchange markets then determine the exchange rate.
(3) Increased democratic accountability through clear criteria to judge policy and through reporting mechanisms.
(4) Ministerial power to override the Bank’s objective, subject to Parliamentary approval.
(5) To safeguard monetary policy independence, the Bank ceases to be banker to the government.
Written at a time when withdrawal from the ERM had left the UK without a credible monetary policy anchor, the panel’s recommendations offered a timely solution. Subsequent events - from the decision in early 1994 to publish the minutes of the meetings of the Chancellor and Governor to the announcement by the new Labour government of a framework for the Bank’s independence - have both benefited from and justified their deliberations. Whether the politicians will go as far as the Report recommends remains to be seen.
This report offers a concise and pertinent analysis of the issues surrounding central bank independence, with strong implications for the current proposed legislation

Your current location: Publications > Books & Reports > CEPR Titles
Top CEPR, 77 Bastwick St, London EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom.
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801     Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820
Email: cepr@cepr.org     Webmaster: webmaster@cepr.org
Home
With the support of the European Union: Support for bodies active at European level in the field of active European citizenship