|
|
European
Economic Perspectives 21
All
Change
Differences
in housing and financial market institutions mean that interest rate
moves will affect eurozone countries in different ways, according to new
CEPR research. How can policy-makers ease the tensions this will
generate?
Despite
the pressures for convergence as a result of the build-up to monetary
union, the differences in housing and financial market institutions
across the 15 EU members remain large. And according to new CEPR
research by Duncan Maclennan, John Muellbauer and Mark Stephens, these
differences will have profound effects on the relative responsiveness of
output and inflation in the different countries to changes in short-term
interest rates, as well as to asset market shocks of external origin.
Though
the pressures for institutions to converge will intensify as the euro
becomes established - and there will be important changes, for example,
in corporate bond markets - the barriers to convergence are often deeply
rooted, not least in different national housing systems. The persistence
of these differences is likely to cause instability in those economies
at the extremes of the spectrum of relevant dimensions, not only
eurozone members such as Finland, Ireland, but also non-members such as
Sweden and the UK.
Such
instability may lead to potentially serious tensions between eurozone
members, these researchers contend. Moreover, unless the issues are
recognised by policy-makers and concerted action is taken, the barriers
to convergence in housing and credit markets and associated legal,
regulatory and fiscal structures will cause these tensions to persist.
They matter for whether the UK and other ‘outs’ join the euro as
much or more than whether business cycles are roughly synchronized at
the moment of entry. Indeed, they matter for the success of the whole
monetary union project.
Previous
attempts to examine differences in the monetary policy transmission
mechanisms between European countries have tended to focus on the
macroeconomic level. A 1995 study by the Bank for International
Settlements, for example, suggests that of the countries studied -
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the
UK - the UK had by far the greatest sensitivity of output to interest
rate rises. Moreover, since variable rate mortgage costs have a large
weight in household budgets, as well as in the retail prices index, the
UK is unique in having a positive
inflation response to a rise in interest rates both in the year of the
rise and the following year before turning negative in the third year.
Maclennan
and his colleagues explore the different mechanisms by which a rise in
short-term interest rates affects the major components of expenditure,
such as consumption and investment. They argue that economists typically
place undue emphasis on minor direct effects, such as ‘intertemporal
substitution’ - the lowering of current consumption in favour of more
future consumption as the interest rate rises. The indirect effects,
which operate through asset prices and expectations of income growth,
are of far more importance in practice but receive less attention.
For
example, institutional differences between countries in pension and
corporate finance systems and differences in the scale of government
debt, reflected in national differences in equity and bond market
capitalization, generate differences in financial asset to income ratios
and in the ‘spendability’ of those assets. A rise in real house
prices not only leads to a positive wealth effect on non-housing
consumption, in the same way as a rise in real share prices, but also a
negative income and substitution effect. This implies a positive effect
on the consumption of owner-occupiers and a negative effect on the
consumption of market renters.
If
rental housing is owned by pension funds, whose assets are regarded as
relatively illiquid by consumers, a rise in house prices has bigger
consumption effects in countries with a small market rental sector and a
high rate of owner occupation. Moreover, countries can vary in the
effective spendability of owner-occupied housing wealth. Spendability is
high where transactions costs are low and where housing is effective
collateral. Together, these differences can imply a tiny impact on
consumption from a rise in real house prices in some countries and a
substantial positive impact in others.
Further
differences can arise in the transmission mechanism between interest
rates and asset prices. Maclennan et
al identify as many as five distinct elements, for example, in the
effect of interest rates on house prices. Not only are there important
non-linear elements in these effects, but differences in history as well
as in the proportions of fixed and floating rate mortgage debt, can
generate big differences between countries.
Indeed,
there are big differences across Europe in housing tenure, in
loan-to-value ratios and mortgage debt to income ratios as measures of
credit availability, and in taxes and other aspects of transactions
costs that affect the size of housing wealth effects on consumption. The
responsiveness of mortgage and other borrowing rates to short-term
interest rates varies greatly across Europe. Financial market
capitalization relative to GDP and, underlying these, banking and
corporate finance systems and especially pension systems differ
substantially.
Available
evidence on the effects of financial and housing assets on consumption
is broadly in accord with the differences between countries predicted by
this analysis. The UK, for example, which tends to be at one extreme in
most relevant dimensions, has a more speculative housing market and
larger housing wealth effects than core eurozone countries like Germany.
Maclennan
and his colleagues
argue that there are strong barriers to convergence between the
different national housing and financial systems. They all have their
roots in different banking histories, state ownership and intervention,
and legal and regulatory structures. For example, Italy’s legal
process governing the use of housing as collateral is effectively
non-functioning. And the mortgage markets in other countries, such as
Germany and France, are notoriously closed to outside entrants.
Nevertheless,
there are institutional reforms and compensating policy shifts that may
ease the tensions generated by national differences and reduce the risks
of membership of the monetary union. The researchers conclude by
suggesting six areas where Finland, Ireland, the UK and, to some degree,
Sweden, whose characteristics tend to cluster at one end of the
institutional spectrum, could take action to reduce the risks of
eurozone membership.
- Encourage
the use of fixed-rate mortgages and loans more generally.
- Place
somewhat tougher prudential upper limits on loan-to-value ratios.
- Particularly
in the UK, retain a more significant ‘pay-as-you-go’ element in
the public pension system.
- Encourage
the development of the private rented sector and encourage the move
towards market rents in as much of the social housing sector as
possible.
- Reduce
house price volatility not by increasing frictions in the housing
market - for example, by raising UK stamp duty to the higher levels
seen elsewhere in Europe - since such measures reduce labour
mobility, but instead by using property taxes more flexibly.
- Encourage
policy-makers in the core eurozone countries to open credit markets,
the legal profession and estate agents to competition, reduce legal
barriers to the use of housing collateral and cut transactions
costs.
The
last three of these reforms would benefit Europe as a whole by
encouraging labour mobility and bringing other efficiency and welfare
gains. This type of harmonization is likely to be more beneficial than
the harmonization of income and corporation taxes that has been so
widely discussed in recent months.
This
article reviews research reported in ‘Asymmetries in Housing
and Financial Market Institutions and EMU’ by Duncan Maclennan, John
Muellbauer and Mark Stephens, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 2062 (January 1999). Muellbauer is at
Nuffield College, Oxford and a CEPR Research Fellow; Maclennan and
Stephens are at Glasgow University.
|
Return to
contents
Browse Archives
|