Culture and Institutions

How and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions? Tabellini argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the "missing link". Evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings. First, individual values consistent with generalized (as opposed to limited) morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non-despotic political institutions in the distant past. Second, well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality, and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes.

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Culture and Institutions, DP6589
Guido Tabellini
www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6589.asp

Guido Tabellini is Professor of Economics at Bocconi University, and President of IGIER at Bocconi University in Milan. Previously, he taught at Stanford University and UCLA. He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a fellow of the Econometric Society, and a joint recipient of the Yrjo Jahnsson award from the European Economic Association. He is a CEPR Research Fellow. He is President of the European Economic Association, and an associate editor of the Journal of the European Economic Association. He has been associate editor of the Journal of Public Economics, the European Economic Review, and other international journals. He has acted as an economic consultant to the Italian government, the European Parliament and the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund. The main focus of his research is on how political and policymaking institutions influence policy formation and economic performance. Much of his recent research is summarised in two books co-authored with Torsten Persson – "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy", MIT Press, 2000; and "The Economic Effects of Constitutions", MIT Press, 2003. He earned his PhD in Economics at UCLA in 1984.