UDROP
– NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
The
world could be spared some of the worst effects of major international
financial crises if debtors were given a breathing space to meet their
obligations when credit markets seize up. A paper published by the
Centre for Economic Policy Research develops the concept of a debt
rollover option for foreign currency borrowers. This would limit the
destructive consequences for the real economy of a crisis of the kind
that occurred two years ago in East Asia. The authors, Professors
Willem Buiter of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and
Cambridge University, and Anne Sibert of Birkbeck College, University
of London, call their version UDROP (Universal Debt Rollover Option
with a Penalty).
In
essence, a foreign currency borrower would, when the debt matures, be
able to defer repayment for a fixed period through the exercise of a
debt rollover option. The
terms of the rollover would be negotiated with the creditor at the
same time as the original loan. The option would be exercised at the
discretion of the debtor. The
proposal aims to prevent solvent borrowers being forced into
unnecessary and socially costly default by a rollover crisis brought
about by disorderly financial markets.
It will improve global economic performance to the extent that
it helps countries that are solvent and willing to pay, but are
prevented from doing so because international financial and credit
markets have a temporary seizure.
Thus South Korea would have benefited from such a scheme, but
it would have been irrelevant in the case of Russia, which is
insolvent even when financial markets are orderly.
When
the crisis struck in 1997, Korea faced huge short-term foreign
currency debts which totalled more than the central bank’s reserves.
The proposed debt-rollover scheme might have enabled it to work its
way out of these short-term financial problems without recourse to the
same contractionary measures that inflicted such damage to the real
economy from mid-1997 onwards.
This
central problem is characteristic of many financial crises. Professors
Buiter and Sibert write, ‘UDROP is meant to address the situation
where a large number of people all try to leave a room simultaneously
through a small door, hotly pursuing a limited number of prizes that
will be handed out on a first-come first-served basis.’
The
mechanism would be rule-based and negotiable between debtor and
creditor. The only involvement of any outside agency might be to
declare the existence of disorderly market conditions, which could be
made a precondition for the exercise of the option by individual
borrowers. Central banks could perform this role at the national, and
the IMF at a global, level.
No
further role for the IMF is envisaged in the scheme. It has to be
mandatory and universal, partly because of the problem of adverse
selection: high quality borrowers might wish to signal their strength by
refusing the option. ‘This could limit or destroy the effectiveness of
any voluntary, market-based scheme.’
In this sense UDROP is rather like health insurance.
The
authors examine many technical features of such a scheme – for
example, the possibility of stripping out the option and trading it
separately. Provided
rollover options were mandatory for all foreign currency debt contracts,
including contingent claims, and provided the rollover were required to
cover the full amount of the foreign currency exposure that would arise
if the contingencies defining the claim were to materialise, the
borrower would not be able to free himself of the rollover obligations.
Universality can be achieved by all IMF members agreeing that foreign
currency debt contracts without
the option would be unenforceable in any members’ courts.
Notes
for Editors:
CEPR
is a network of over 450 Research Fellows based throughout Europe, who
collaborate through the Centre in research and its dissemination. CEPR
helps its Research Fellows to develop projects, obtain their funding,
administer them and disseminate their results. The Centre’s research
ranges from open economy macroeconomics to trade policy, from the
economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe to regionalism in
the world economy. For further information about CEPR, please contact
Rita Gilbert, External Relations Officer, Tel: (44 20) 7878
2917 or email: rgilbert@cepr.org,
or contact James Morgan, Tel: (44 20) 8225 7262.
The
Authors:
Willem
Buiter is Professor of Economics at Cambridge University, a Member of
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, and a Research
Fellow in CEPR’s International Macroeconomics and Transition Economics
programmes. Anne Sibert is
Professor of Economics at Birbeck College, University of London.
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