

Claiming more: the Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its Determinants*

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Abstract

The size of patent applications has doubled over the past two decades, resulting in a dramatic surge in patent offices' workload all over the world. This paper investigates the sources of this inflation in claims and pages for EPO applications. Four hypotheses are quantitatively tested: the diffusion of national drafting practices, the complexification of research activities, the emergence of new sectors, and patenting strategies. The results first reveal major differences across countries in patent drafting styles, especially between Civil and Common Law countries, the latter being characterized by much larger patents. Second, the success of the PCT route is leading to the harmonization of drafting styles worldwide toward the U.S. model, suggesting that the verbosity of patent drafters is not only due to the greediness of patentees but also to changes in patent systems. Finally, filing strategies, emerging sectors, and technological complexity are also important factors affecting the voluminosity of patents.

Keywords: Patent voluminosity, IP strategy, Claim drafting, Patent systems

JEL classification codes: K1; K3; L1; O3

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1. Introduction

Patents, given their strategic importance in the knowledge-based economy, have increasingly become an object of intense covetousness and disputes between industry players. At the very heart of this rivalry are the patented claims, which define the legal scope of the invention for which protection is being granted. Therefore, patent applicants¹ tend to draft their patents with more claims to broaden the scope of the protection and to make them more resistant to invalidation challenges (Bessen 2006). This may – among other factors – have resulted into the observed continuous inflation in patent applications sizes over the past two decades (Archontopoulos et al. 2007).

Claim counts have been extensively used in the economic literature as a measure of the ‘size’ of an invention (Tong and Frame 1994), which has proved to be related to the probability that a patent is litigated (Lanjouw and Schankerman 1997) and to other patent value indicators (Lanjouw et al. 1998; Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999). But, to the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid so far to the evolution of those numbers and to the underlying changes that may have occurred in patent systems and technology markets around the world, driving patentees to adapt their drafting practices.

Once something totally unconceivable, applications of over thousand pages are now frequently filed at the European Patent Office (EPO)² and other patent offices around the world, and several applications even reached 100,000 pages or up to 20,000 claims in recent years.³ To a larger scale, the EPO has witnessed a radical surge in the size of patent applications over the past two decades no matter it is measured in terms of number of claims or pages in the filed documents. While the former indicator has almost doubled from 10 to about 18 claims per application between 1980 and 2002, the latter has witnessed a similar evolution in an even shorter period, from 14 pages in 1988 to 30 pages per application in 2002. This effect, combined with the well known boom in the number of patent filings themselves, is in fact generating such a workload on patent offices that the EPO has to deal with a huge backlog of applications still to be searched for or examined, as pointed out by Archontopoulos et al. (2007).⁴

The key question raised by this evolution of drafting practices in Europe is whether it results from an increasing greed of patentees in claiming for more protection, from structural and exogenous changes in patent systems, technologies and market conditions, or from other factors. This question precisely introduces the objective of this paper: to provide a coherent analysis of the determinants of patent applications’ voluminosity and to identify the major

¹ In what follows, the term ‘applicant’ will be used to refer to the person, institution or firm having applied for the patent and who is, in the European patent system, the initial owner of the patent rights (the equivalent of the ‘assignee’ in the U.S.). By virtue of this ‘first to file’ principle, the term ‘patentee’ may refer either to the applicant/assignee or to the actual inventor of the patent.

² Established by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC) signed in Munich 1973, the EPO is the outcome of the European countries’ collective political determination to establish a uniform patent system in Europe. The EPO was set up by the contracting states to the EPC with the aim of strengthening co-operation between the countries of Europe in the protection of inventions. This was achieved by adopting the EPC, which makes it possible to obtain such protection in several or all of the contracting states by a single patent grant procedure, and establishes standard rules governing the treatment of patents granted by this procedure. By filing a single application in one of the three official languages (English, French and German) it is possible to obtain patent protection in some or all of the EPC contracting states. The resulting patent is, however, not a single patent but rather a bundle of national patents. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) provide an in-depth description of the European patent system.

³ See Stevensborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a detailed analysis of filing strategies.

⁴ See chapter 5 of Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for an illustration of this issue at the USPTO.

drivers of its surge, which requires exploring the very intimate anatomy of patent applications and systems.

The approach relies on a quantitative model applied to a unique database with data on more than one and a half million EPO applications, filed between 1982 and 2004. In addition, this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to empirically scrutinize the determinants of two essential dimensions of a patent's drafting: its number of claims and of pages, which may represent respectively the 'size' and the amount of disclosure of the patent.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews possible interpretations of the number of patent claims and pages and elaborates on the reasons why voluminosity matters in the patent system. Section 3 is devoted to the development of a set of four broad hypotheses associated with an application's characteristics, which could contribute to determine its size and to explain the observed phenomena. The econometric model, its results and interpretations of the determinants of patent voluminosity follow in section 4. Concluding remarks are exposed in section 5.

The results are threefold. First, they reveal fundamental differences in patent drafting styles between Civil and Common Law countries, with the latter system clearly leading to much larger patents on average. This result is consistent with a prolific literature observing similar differences between the U.S. and continental Europe in the size of commercial contracts.⁵ Second, the internationalization of patenting procedures and the increasing success of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)⁶ lead to the harmonization of drafting styles around the world in favour of the U.S. model. Following a kind of 'draft once, file everywhere' principle, patentees seem to opt for a U.S. drafting style as soon as they plan to file their application internationally. This diffusion of Common Law compliant drafting styles in Europe has a major aftermath on the European patent system. This also suggests that the observed inflation in patent drafting may to a large extent be due to changes in patent systems and technology markets and not only to a real increase in the average scope of protection claimed. Third, the fast emergence of new technologies (namely biotechnologies, telecommunications and computers) in the patent field, the increasing technological complexity of inventions and to a lower extent some elements of patenting strategies also appear as significant determinants of the voluminosity.

2. Inflation in patent applications' voluminosity

A patent document is made of bibliographic data (providing information on the applicant, inventor, technological classes, references to the existing prior art, etc.), a specification or description of the invention, a set of claims (what the patentee is claiming exclusive rights on, aka the patent's scope of protection), and finally – but optionally – some illustrations

⁵ E.g. Van Hecke (1962), Langbein (1987), Lundmark (2001), Von Westphalen (2004), Hill and King (2004).

⁶ The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), subscribed to by most of the members of the Paris Convention and supervised by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), offers inventors a major way of deferring patenting expenses. Under this Treaty, one can file an 'International Patent Application', which doesn't turn into some sort of international patent, but primarily acts as a vehicle to buy a period of time within which to proceed with national or regional (such as the EPO) patent applications. Instead of having only a twelve month time period within which an inventor must file foreign applications in order to claim priority, with the PCT, the inventor can gain an additional eighteen months before having to incur the relatively large expenses of completing the applications at each of the designated offices. Those additional months can be crucial to the exploitation of an invention. They may give the inventor additional time to raise the funds required to file patent applications in a large number of countries, or provide additional time within which to gauge the economic importance of the invention, or to find licensees or even partners for the project.

supporting the specification and claims in the form of drawings, listings, gene sequences, etc. As they constitute the legal core of a patent, the claims have been subject to numerous investigations in the economic literature.⁷ Their most appropriate interpretation is however still unclear.⁸

The number of claims might reflect a **broader scope of protection** since more subject matter is included. This is the dominant interpretation in the literature (e.g. Tong and Frame 1994; Lanjouw and Shankerman 1999), and it is confirmed by practitioners in many cases. Not all. The breadth of a patent is often tied to the wording of claims – e.g. replacing the word ‘rodent’ by the word ‘mouse’ will drastically shrink the scope of a patent. Adding claims could even in certain cases signal a narrower filing – e.g. listing three types of rodents takes three claims, while just mentioning rodents takes one. However it is empirically sound to consider that the number of claims is overall positively correlated with the scope of protection.⁹

More claims may nevertheless also denote a **more detailed definition** of the protected area, adding precision: instead of giving a generic term which could be somewhat vague, the applicant will list extensively and individually all potential components of the subject matter. The purpose could be to secure the legal validity of the patent in case of licensing or in case of litigation. It could also be to construct ‘fall back positions’ in the course of the examination procedure or in view of the application of the doctrine of equivalents. By having a series of claims partly overlapping, partly fitted into each other, the applicant has the possibility of fine tuning the scope of protection in front of the examiner’s objections and to maximize her chances to be able to claim infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. This is of particular relevance in the U.S. where something is deemed equivalent only if the variation between the features of the infringing device or process and the patented claim are ‘insubstantial’.¹⁰

Finally, the number of claims may be the result of some ‘**strategic choice**’, as clearly suggested by Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007). More claims may indeed betray a willingness of the applicant to hide the true invention in the middle of many ‘non inventions’, using vagueness as a weapon. This could be either because the applicant wants to deceive competitors or patent examiners, or because she does not know herself at the time of filing what the real invention is. For instance the inventor of a chemical product, after experiments, would identify a family of compounds, some members of which would have a certain property, but she does not know which one of them has it. She will therefore list all the members in the application, in order not to miss the right one. In order to write such patent applications, it is possible to use some *ad-hoc* software (commercially available) that will combine various works or sequences of letters in as many ways as needed, so that one might draft automatically a patent application with thousands of claims coming from the same mould and covering a broad field, a tiny part of which only is of any relevance.

⁷ Article 69 of the EPC, based on the Strasbourg Convention of 1963, clearly states that the claims aim at demarcating the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent (see Sherman, 1991).

⁸ The distinction between independent and dependent claims might be somewhat helpful in this respect but such a distinction does unfortunately not exist in EPO data for there should normally be only one independent claim (possibly one per category of invention) in each application and for no fees are based on the distinction between dependent and independent claims.

⁹ Note that the number and scope of claims are usually restricted during the examination, so that granted patents are narrower than applications (on average, granted patents have one to two claims less than when applied).

¹⁰ See Marr (2003), Meurer and Nard (2005), and Lichtman (2006) for extensive analyses of the U.S. doctrine of equivalents, and Chandler (2000) for a discussion on the different aspects of prosecution history estoppel.

Such a strategy makes obviously sense in the case of inventions still in the early stage, not mature enough for being completely and precisely described. Hence one would expect the following strategy from the applicant: first, filing a broad application, with many claims most of which are irrelevant, then filing divisional applications, possibly over several generations (i.e. divisionals of divisionals) so as to restrict progressively the scope of protection while research is advancing and still benefiting from the earliest priority.¹¹ Such behaviour may be suspected for instance in the case of a few gigantic patent applications filed in 2004 at the WIPO by Angiotech International AG, a Swiss biotech company, with a U.S. priority and 5-digit numbers of claims, up to 19,368.

Notably resulting from the number and length of the claims, the number of pages might be seen as the **extent of the disclosure of the invention**, without presuming of its quality. The more thorough the description and the more exhaustive the drawings, the more pages the application will contain and the more it may divulge on the invention. In parallel with the claims, the average number of pages in patent applications has witnessed a drastic surge over the past two decades with record applications of up to 140,000 pages filed at the WIPO in 2000.¹² Here again, more voluminous files might just be needed for more complex inventions, requiring more wording, details and possibly illustrations to be entirely disclosed. Or it might be the result of a deliberate **willingness to hide the true invention** in the middle of gigantic applications, creating a new variant of submarine patents.¹³

An implicit and key question is whether such jumbo-applications do matter. Obviously, they do. As does the overall increasing size of patents, for it has an impact on the patent system, the economy and the society at large. To the economy, more claims often mean that broader protection is sought, inducing a higher cost to society, and possibly more uncertainty for competitors during the examination procedure and beyond. To patent offices, more claims or pages mean more work, hence more resources allocated to searching and examining the files, which induces an additional pressure on quality. What is more, this growing size of applications comes along with a very sharp increase in the number of patent filings themselves, which have been multiplied by 2 over the past 10 years. As a result, the total number of claims and pages to be examined by the EPO for instance is now growing exponentially.

< INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >

The increase in the average number of claims and pages in applications filed to the EPO is depicted in Figure 1 and summary statistics for these indicators are provided in Table 1. It shows that these numbers have increased over the past two decades, and especially since the nineties with a 50% increase in the number of claims (21 claims per patent on average in 2004 against 14 in 1994) and pages (30 pages per patent in 2002 against 20 in 1994). Other patent offices around the world have experienced a similar phenomenon.

¹¹ Continuations in part and reissues are not allowed in the European Patent System.

¹² UNDP 2001:103.

¹³ ‘Submarine patent’ usually referred to a patent published long after the original application was filed. Like a submarine, it stayed under water (unpublished) for long, then emerged (i.e. was granted and published), and surprised the whole market. Since applications are now published after 18 months in most countries, no matter they are already granted or not, submarine patents *per se* have disappeared, except for USPTO filings with no international extension, which are only published at grant. Jumbo applications make nowadays the new ‘*de facto*’ submarine patents. The hidden claims, regularly unknown by the applicant herself at the time of filing, can only be identified by text mining techniques.

3. Hypotheses on the determinants of patent voluminosity

In order to explain the increasing voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO, four broad candidate hypotheses have been identified. These hypotheses are to be tested with a dataset composed of all patent applications at the EPO filed between 1982 and 2004, which makes 1,551,769 filings.

H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures

Anecdotal evidences in Archontopoulos et al. (2007) have clearly highlighted important differences in the average size of patent applications originating from different countries. Despite the progressive harmonization of patent systems notably induced by the TRIPS, essential differences in national patent law subsist between countries, which may explain these discrepancies in voluminosity.

As observed and scrutinized by an abundant literature, commercial contracts in the U.S. are usually much larger than their continental European counterparts.¹⁴ In explaining the observed differences in contract sizes, the various authors refer to different aspects of the U.S. legal system and culture at large as compared to continental ones as well as to specific aspects relating to contract law, which may lead to a higher verbosity in U.S. contract drafting. In particular, they point to the ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers and the relative uncertainty of the Common Law (Van Hecke 1962), the superiority of the civil procedure in Germany as compared to the U.S. (Langbein 1987), the obligation of good faith in continental contracting (Von Westphalen 2004), a general U.S. distrust of judges and a strong inclination for the freedom of contract (Lundmark 2001), a propensity to ‘stop sooner’ the arm’s race in customizing a contract, the reliance in continental Europe to standardized ‘good enough’ solutions, the applicability without any reference to standard provisions (mandatory or default), definitive interpretations and definitions of common terms established by the law, as well as a lower propensity to litigate on the Continent and the attitude of continental judges in interpreting contract terms (Hill and King 2004).

When turning to patent drafting, one may reasonably expect that those characteristics of the U.S. legal system and culture that induce longer commercial contracts should also induce longer patent drafts. In particular, the presumed ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers, the more intense recourse to customization and details in U.S. legal documents, the limited availability of general terms and definitions provided by the law, the higher propensity to litigate and the smaller foreseeability of judges’ decisions (notably due to the traditionally larger role of precedents in Common Law Courts’ decisions as compared to continental European Courts and to the Common Law tradition allowing its judges to establish broad principles of law in the absence of legislation) may all contribute to more detailed patent drafts. Lundmark (2001) also evokes an unresponsive dispute resolution practice in the U.S., by which Common Law judges are of no help in terms of interpretation when a need for clarity rises in litigation. In this legal tradition, the need for clarity and specificity mounts dramatically. The same author further points to the discovery mechanisms in Common Law countries, leaving a much weaker power to the judges, which also puts a higher premium on the clarity and details in legal documents. All these factors feed a huge fear of litigation in the U.S. (particularly in the

¹⁴ Van Hecke (1962) reported the case of a U.S. firm willing to contract with a Belgian counterpart. The former submitted to the latter two drafts of contract containing about 10,000 words together. The Belgian firm, shocked by the length of the document, refused to pursue the negotiation unless she was allowed to propose a new draft for the contract. The Belgian draft, with barely 1400 words, was finally agreed on and executed by both parties as the American firm acknowledged the document included all the substance that was really needed.

absence of a ‘subsidizing losers’ rule and given the very high stakes reached in some cases), which forces legal patentees to add precision so as to reduce their exposure to the system.

In addition to these general features of the U.S. legal environment, various national specificities of patent systems may also induce different patent drafting behaviours. In particular, the U.S. doctrine of equivalents and the file history estoppel are two major characteristics of the U.S. patent system, which have strongly influenced patentees’ behaviour.¹⁵ According to the latter principle, strongly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Festo case (Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)), a party who makes a change to a patent application to accommodate the requirements of patent law cannot claim indirect infringement of an element that was narrowed by that change. However, this case was only a recent example in a long series of rulings which progressively reduced the practical applicability of the doctrine of equivalents.¹⁶ Hence to be able to use the doctrine of equivalents, applicants tend to embed in their draft very detailed fall-back positions that they can use in case of litigation for saving as much as possible of the protection afforded by their patent (see e.g. Wheeler 2003).

Another specificity of U.S. patent law is that claims cannot be cross-referred as much as they are in Europe, forcing applicants to add claims instead of strengthening the overall structure of the application. In addition, the mandatory best mode to be detailed in USPTO applications but not in EPO or JPO ones might be yet another contributor to this effect. It is indeed frequent practice by American patentees to detail several utilization modes to hide the ‘best’ one, possibly leading to longer descriptions as well. One could finally argue that patents play a more crucial role in competitive processes in the U.S. than in other parts of the world, so that companies will invest more in patent drafting, prosecuting and enforcement.¹⁷

Conversely, the Japanese system is known for the low number of claims composing each patent. Therefore, when the protection of a Japanese invention is extended abroad, several priority patents are often merged to form a single U.S. or EPO application.¹⁸ This practice might also result in EPO patent applications of different sizes than the average patent applications from other countries.

In addition, different fee regimes in place in the various patent offices around the world may further influence the number of claims and pages. At the EPO, additional fees are incurred when the total number of claims exceeds 10, against 20 in the U.S. system. This difference may also influence patent drafting styles, as observed or suggested by Brooks and Ware (2005), van Pottelsberghe and François (2006), and Archontopoulos et al. (2007).

¹⁵ At the EPO, it is required that the ‘*number of the claims shall be reasonable in consideration of the nature of the invention claimed.*’ (Rule 29(5) EPC). Under Rule 29(2) EPC, there should be only one single independent claim in each ‘category’ (product, process, apparatus or use). More may be allowed ‘*where it is not appropriate, having regard to the subject-matter of the application, to cover this subject-matter by a single claim.*’ To the contrary, a U.S. application may have a multiplicity of independent claims.

¹⁶ Marr (2003) reported e.g. Judge Rader’s decision in Johnson & Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1059, himself citing Federal Circuit cases dating as far back as 1984, that: “*The patentee has an obligation to draft claims that capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention. The doctrine of equivalents would not rescue a claim drafter who does not provide such notice. Foreseeability thus places a premium on notice while reserving a limited role for the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.*”

¹⁷ See Hall et al. (2004) for an in-depth analysis of U.S. patent litigation processes.

¹⁸ Although the cost of filing a patent application at the EPO will depend – among other factors – on the number of claims it contains, it is usually less costly to file a single application with several claims rather than a number of applications with fewer claims, notwithstanding the unity of the claimed protection. Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) provide in-depth simulations of the price structure of patent filings.

Archontopoulos et al. (2007) also suggested a strong impact of international patenting procedures, and more specifically of the PCT on the voluminosity of EPO applications. By lengthening the international ‘waiting’ phase from one year to 30 months, the PCT option provides more time to the applicants to assess the economic value of their invention before taking the decision to file abroad or not, which induces significant expenses. If the patent is effectively filed abroad after 30 months, the total cost is slightly higher than the non PCT route towards the EPO patent (Dernis et al. 2001). But if the patent is dropped into the public domain, the total cost of the patenting process is lower than direct EPO applications. This may explain why the PCT option has met an increasing success over the past 20 years, from 15% of EPO applications in 1985 to 50% in 2000, a figure which is currently stable. Furthermore, the PCT does not involve any additional fee for excess claims and allows (under PCT Rules 40 and 68) to separate groups of claims to be directed to separate inventions in the International Search and Preliminary Exam in case the unity of invention is lacking. Hence, it is all easy and costless for applicants to draft more claims than may be needed when their PCT application is filed to ultimately obtain protection in Europe.

Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is that national patent systems strongly influence the way patent applications are drafted, that the original application drafted for one particular country determines the form of the subsequent application filed internationally, and that the increasing success of the PCT option encourages this approach. As patents are indeed increasingly applied within a worldwide strategy, patentees presumably draft one single patent – often with a U.S. template – then apply it to other offices around the world through the PCT procedure.

To capture these potential factors in the empirical model, a set of dummy variables has been computed, which are described in table 2: *PCT* takes the value 1 if the application was filed under the PCT option and 0 in case of a Euro-Direct filing with or without an earlier national priority; *USPR* identifies those applications filed with a U.S. priority by a non-U.S. applicant, which is the case for a bit more than 3% of EPO applications, as shown in Table 2; *USAP* takes the value 1 for applications filed by a U.S. applicant with a non-U.S. priority, representing about 1.5% of applications. The two latter variables, *USPR* and *USAP*, will allow making a distinction between cultural effects (referring to the country of origin of the applicant) and institutional effects (pertaining to the local patent law in the country for which the application was supposedly initially intended, that is the country of priority). To complete the set of variables, 19 country dummies identify the country of residence of the applicants.¹⁹ Table 2 shows that 29% of EPO applications originate from the USA, 20% from Germany and 18% from Japan. When the number of pages is the dependent variable, the language of the publication must be taken into account with the variable *NO_EPL*. This variable is equal to 1 when the number of pages refers to another language than the three official EPO languages (English, French or German).²⁰

¹⁹ The 18 largest countries whose applicants have filed at least 10,000 EPO applications (about 0.5% of the total sample) over the entire period (1978-2004) were selected. The other countries were identified by the dummy variable ‘*APP_ROW*’. Note that given their very high correlation with countries of priority, using the latter ones produces very similar results.

²⁰ According to Archontopoulos et al. (2007), the country of the applicant is a fairly good proxy for the language of filing (patentees tending to file their EPO applications in either their home language or English if they have no EPO language). But under Article 14 of EPC, it is possible for applicants to file their patents in non-EPO languages provided they supply a valid translation within 3 months. In some countries (especially Japan), applicants often tend (for up to 30 or 35% of their applications) to file their applications in their home language instead, making the applicant country-language correspondence less predictable, hence the need to control for non-EPO languages in our model.

< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >

H2: Technical complexity

As technology becomes more complex, more words may be required to describe and claim it. Notably because a dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant may really see farther than a giant himself, architectural inventions tend to lead to increasingly complex inventions and technologies over time, produced by larger and larger teams of inventors with complementary skills and expertise. If this assumption had to be true and if more complex technologies do require longer descriptions, one may expect that the rise in technological complexity will drive the voluminosity of subsequent patent applications.

This hypothesis is measured with 4 discrete variables: *INV*, representing the number of inventors listed in the application; *IPC8*, the number of IPC (International Patent Classification) classes at 8 digits associated with the invention, which denotes the technological diversity embodied in the invention, i.e. an ‘architectural invention’ resulting from a process of combination of existing ideas and devices (see for instance Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2000; 2002);²¹ *BPC*, the number of citations made to previous patents, which indicates a larger use of prior ‘patented’ art; and *NPC*, the number of citations to the scientific literature made by the application, which identifies science-based inventions. Table 2 indicates that the average EPO application has been produced by 2.4 inventors (with a maximum of 53), covers about two IPC8 classes (up to 49), and makes 4.5 citations to earlier patents (with a maximum of 125) and only about 1 reference to the scientific literature (up to 170, however).

H3: Emerging sectors

The wording space required for the codification of an invention may vary substantially across technological areas. The vocabulary of more recent technologies may be less standardised than in more established fields, requiring more detailed descriptions. Emerging technical fields rely more on recent science than older fields, and are based on (yet) less well known natural phenomena, which require more explanation than artefacts based on mechanisms recognised and accepted for long. This is notably the case for biotechnology, based on molecular biology, and of software, based on maths, algorithm and operational research. Furthermore, markets where technology is the most important competitive argument, where there is more licensing and cross-licensing, may encourage industry players to establish their rights with higher precision. Therefore, the sectoral specificity of a patent application might very well affect its voluminosity, and the surge in patenting in new, science-based and extremely competitive technological areas might contribute to the increase in patent voluminosity at large.

This hypothesis is tested through 14 dummies representing the joint clusters used at the EPO to dispatch the applications to the proper examination departments. These dummy variables were computed from the IPC4 classes associated with the applications, through a matching table in use at the EPO at the time of this study. These clusters (JC) – listed in Table 2 – represent broad technological areas, such as industrial chemistry (JC-01), telecommunications (JC-05) and human necessities (JC-14). Organic chemistry (JC-02), handling and processing (JC-11), and biotechnologies (JC-04) are the largest technological areas. Their shares in total EPO applications are 13.6, 12.5 and 12.1% respectively, while the computers and audio,

²¹ See van Zeebroeck et al. (2006) for an analysis of the impact of the choice of a classification on patent statistics.

video and media joint clusters are the smallest ones, each accounting for about 5% of all EPO applications.

H4: Patenting strategies

As the IP strategy of companies in certain industries has moved from being static (leveraging exclusion rights) to more active (trading rights, using them for licenses or other strategic purposes defined in Guellec et al. (2007)), their patent strategy has changed from a ‘single patent’ view to a ‘portfolio management’ view. It is well known that some large firms have a large propensity to patent their inventions. IBM for instance has used the fact it is the largest patentee in the USA as a marketing tool for several years and Microsoft has recruited an IP officer (from IBM) for developing its patenting strategy with a view to outperform IBM in this respect. In this context, what matters can then become the size and strength of the portfolio rather than the quality (scope, ability to stand in courts) of any single patent (see for instance Shapiro 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; and Bessen 2003).

The number of claims per patent could be the result, intended or not, of certain strategic choices of applicants, such as the ones detailed in section 2. One such strategy is the early patenting of yet unfocused inventions, which are narrowed down later in the process of examination. This could be identified through the use of divisionals: a divisional application is a sub-part of an initial application which does not satisfy the requirement of the EPC regarding the unity of the invention, but of which the applicant can secure the most important claims in a smaller application with a similar priority number and one or several further applications with the same priority date. One would expect that in the case of a divisionals strategy, the initial application, the ‘parent’, would be bigger than average.

A second aspect may be the experience or lack of experience of the patentees with the patent system. In many cases, it will be easier to draft a longer application than a shorter one, resulting in applications with many unclear, often overlapping and redundant claims. This comes from under-staffed patent departments, or from the need to hire new, inexperienced staff that could not be properly trained. This is often not intended by the applicant, notably as it reduces the chances of having a quick grant and increases processing costs (due to more interactions with the examiners etc.), but it is a by-product of a strategy putting quantity over quality as a priority and may in some seldom cases be the effect a deliberate strategy to pollute a technological field or create a smoke screen around it.

These various aspects of patenting strategies are captured through a set of 5 variables: *PRIO* provides the number of priority patents claimed in the EPO application (about 1.2 on average); *HASDIV* identifies those applications that gave rise to subsequent divisional filings, which is the case of about 2% of the dataset; to the contrary, *ISDIV* isolates divisional filings themselves, representing about 2.4% of the filings. Finally, building on Kortum and Lerner (1999)’s approach, two variables are built up: *SIZE* gives the cumulative number of additional applications filed by the same applicant during the same year and the four consecutive previous years (420 filings on average) and *OCCAS* represents the inexperience of the applicant by marking those applications that are the only filing of their applicants in the current and the four previous years (about 23% of the filings). These two latter variables were computed using the official applicant codes from the main EPO database, i.e. without any cleaning of applicants’ names.²²

²² Following Trajtenberg (2004), this means that our data is subject to ‘type I errors’ only, i.e. missing names that should go together, which leads to a likely underestimation of the variable *SIZE* and overestimation of the

H0: The time trend

Next to all these potential factors, patents may become larger and larger simply as a consequence of global changes in economic environments, in market conditions, in courts behaviours and expectations, or in writing and documenting norms, to mention only a few. This overall trend, extraneous to the above hypotheses, might be related to a general propensity toward increasingly lengthy and detailed technical descriptions in every field of human activities over time. Figure 1 precisely illustrates a clear trend component in the increasing voluminosity (the drop of the number of pages in the mid eighties is an artefact due to changes in the patent format at EPO). Therefore, it is important to capture in a way this potential effect of time and potentially non-accounted for factors through the four main hypotheses. Table 2 further reflects the constant increase in the number of filings in recent years (the drop in 2004 is another artefact due here to the exclusion of the numerous international PCT filings not yet duly transferred to the EPO), as already observed by Kortum and Lerner (1999) in the United States.²³ To capture this trend, the model includes a set of 23 time dummies representing the year of filing at the EPO.

4. Empirical results

The model

The following model is used in order to test the four broad hypotheses on the determinants of voluminosity:

$$V_i = f(\beta_j, H_{ji}, T_i) + e_i, \quad (1)$$

where V denotes the voluminosity indicators (number of claims or number of pages) for each patent i ($i=1, \dots, 1,551,769$). The endogenous variables are described in table 1. β_j are the vectors of parameters to be estimated. H_j are the vectors of explanatory variables, described in Table 2 and summarized in Table 3 corresponding to the four main hypotheses ($j=1, \dots, 4$). T captures the trend factor (represented by time dummies) and e is the error term. Our dataset, created from different EPO databases,²⁴ comprises all Euro-direct and Euro-transferred PCT applications filed at the EPO between 1978 and 2004.²⁵ The estimates are run over the periods 1982-2004 for the number of claims and 1988-2002 for the number of pages (due to the formatting issues discussed here below and to the unavailability of page counts data for post 2002 applications).

< INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE >

Our empirical methodology consists first in running subsequent estimates of equation (E1) with an OLS regression on the basic sample, with each independent variable and each individual hypothesis alone, and then with all the hypotheses simultaneously. The objective

variable *OCCAS*. With other words, some patentees may have been erroneously declared occasional and recurrent patentees probably have larger portfolios in reality than accounted in our data.

²³ Kortum and Lerner (1999) suggest that the increase in patenting in the U.S. has been driven by changes in the management of innovation of U.S. firms which brought a real burst of innovation and an increased propensity to patent. Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) provide evidence on the impact of these changes on the size of patent portfolios. These changes include an intensification of collaborative R&D, especially with universities; a focus on basic and applied research, an orientation towards product innovation, and the ability to reduce or overcome the traditional barriers to innovation.

²⁴ Including EPO (2006).

²⁵ See Khan and Dernis (2005) for an interesting discussion on the impact of including or excluding international phase PCT applications on EPO statistics.

is to get first a broad idea of the explanatory power of each of the four hypotheses at large, then to estimate the simultaneous impact of the determinants included in each of the four hypotheses, and finally to calculate the contributions of the various factors at the aggregate level. To perform the two latter steps, the count nature (i.e. discreteness and non-negativeness) and high skewness depicted by the distribution of the dependent variables (see figure 2), dictate the recourse to a count model with a negative binomial specification (see Hausmann, Hall and Griliches (1984) and Cameron and Trivedi (1986)).²⁶ Hence, we assume that the number of claims and pages is an exponential function of the variables listed above, so that the general form of the log-linear regression model specification would be:

$$E[V_i|H_i, T_i] = \lambda_i = \exp\left(\sum_{j=1}^4 \beta_j H_{ji} + \beta_i T_i + e_i\right) \quad (2)$$

The error term e represents unobserved variables and measurement errors on the data and is assumed to be Gamma distributed with parameters $1/\alpha$ where α is the overdispersion parameter. The dispersion for the i -th observation is a function of the expected mean of the counts for this observation, i.e. $1 + \alpha\lambda_i$. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood for the negative binomial distribution. The reported likelihood ratio test for overdispersion (α) rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion, which reinforces the preference for the negative binomial regression model over the pure Poisson one.

< INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE >

Figure 2 displays the frequency distribution of the endogenous variables (claims and pages). At first look, it reveals a high skewness of both distributions, with a very long upper tail, especially with page counts. Moreover, a strong institutional bias appears in the distribution of claim numbers in the form of an absolute mode of the distribution at 10 claims. This bias is due to EPO's excess-claim fees, making an additional fee due as from the eleventh claim on, which suggests some kind of price elasticity of the number of claims to claim-based fees. An analogous though weaker effect can furthermore be observed at 20 claims, which corresponds to the equivalent USPTO limit. Since the objective of this exercise is more to understand why applicants file claims in excess of the institutional threshold, the estimates are run on a transformed number of claims, shifted by ten units to the left according to equation (3), with M equal to 10.²⁷

$$V_i' = \max(V_i - M; 0) \quad (3)$$

The number of pages has been perturbed by some external factors, as discussed by Archontopoulos et al. (2007). The most critical issue comes from the fact that EPO-Direct and PCT applications have different formats. Since the mid-eighties, when direct applications have been filed at the EPO, the description and claims sections of the applied documents have indeed been computerized and reformatted by the Office into a standard highly compact template, also known as 'type-set' format. This reformatting of direct EPO applications, with the same font and layout for all EPO applications, makes the number of pages of these

²⁶ The sample variance of the number of claims is about 146, and it is about 1292 for the number of pages, indicating substantial overdispersion in raw terms in both cases.

²⁷ Note that this transformation further increases the overdispersion of the distribution, yet reinforcing the choice of a negative binomial specification over a pure Poisson one.

documents highly comparable with each other. To the contrary, PCT applications have not been reformatted by the EPO and the number of pages in the database corresponds then to the original (and heterogeneous) facsimile documents, as it can be observed in figure A1 in the appendix. Because of these formatting issues, the number of pages can hardly be analyzed for pre-1988 applications and must be controlled for the filing route as of 1988. The *PCT* variable should therefore capture this structural effect and be granted higher an explanatory power on the number of pages than it really deserves. Here also, in order to focus on pages in excess of the distribution mode, the model in (2) is nevertheless estimated with a transformed number of pages, according to (3) with M equals to 6.

Various robustness tests have been performed, largely confirming the results presented below: estimating the same model with OLS regressions, with priority countries instead of applicants countries, dropping variables, running the estimates (both negative binomial and OLS) on small random samples or different sub periods, performing separate regressions by country and by sector as well as for PCT *versus* Euro-Direct filings or for grants versus applications, and using priority countries instead of applicants' countries. In addition, the same model with a slightly reduced set of variables has been run on an extended dataset, including international PCT filings for which the EPO was designated as the International Search Agent (ISA) (1,931,631 filings in total), in which the international or regional status of PCT applications was also controlled for.²⁸ Finally, to evaluate the impact of the formatting issues evoked here above on the estimates of the number of pages, the same model has been run to explain the number of evenly-formatted granted patents in parallel with the number of pages in the corresponding initial applications. This latter test shows that this formatting issue does not distort the results presented here. More generally, all these tests are in line with and supportive of the following results.²⁹

The explanatory power of the four hypotheses

The adjusted R-squared of the OLS estimations with the four broad hypotheses individually are presented in Table 4. It clearly shows that each hypothesis and the model at large are stronger at explaining the number of pages than the number of claims.

< INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE >

At first sight it appears that the most relevant hypotheses are the 'national practices and internationalization of patenting procedures' and the 'technological complexity' hypotheses (*H1* and *H2*, respectively) followed by the 'emerging sectors' and 'patenting strategies' hypotheses (*H3* and *H4*, respectively). When explaining the number of claims, the first hypothesis has a very high explanatory power (with an adjusted R-squared of about 11%). The technological complexity hypothesis explains about 5% of the variance and the emerging sectors, patenting strategies and trend, about 3% each. For the number of pages, although the ranking is the same, hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 have more explanatory power than for the claims, with 11% for the former and 7% for the two latter. However, it is important to bear in mind that the '*PCT*' variable within *H1* captures the effect of the reformatting issue evoked here above and hence is granted much stronger a power than it probably deserves. Nevertheless, even when separating PCT applications (in heterogeneous facsimile formats) from Euro-Direct applications (in type-set format) within clustered regressions or when looking at the

²⁸ I.e. without backward citations in the complexity hypothesis and without the *ISDIV* variable in the patenting strategies hypothesis for these variables were not available on international PCT applications.

²⁹ The results of all the robustness estimates are available upon request.

evenly type-set formatted grant publications, the explanatory power of *H1* on the number of pages remains very high (with an adjusted- R-squared of 0.09 in the latter regression).

All this suggests the following preliminary observations:

- The model looks better at explaining the number of pages than the number of claims.
- The first hypothesis (*H1*) has the strongest explanatory power, suggesting at first sight that country-specific features (languages, patent cultures, drafting modes, parameters of the patent system) play the most important role on the size (claims and pages) of patent applications at EPO.
- The technological complexity comes clearly second in both cases, followed by the emerging sectors and patenting strategies at equal distance.
- Finally, the trend is weaker than the hypotheses, albeit slightly stronger with the number of claims than pages.

When all the hypotheses are included in the model, the estimates explain about 18% of the variance in the number of claims and 26% of the variance in the number of pages.

Maximum likelihood estimates for the negative binomial distribution are reported in Table 5, which displays the estimated parameters for both claims and pages counts.

National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures

The results provide strong support for the ‘national practices and internationalization of patenting procedures’ hypothesis. Indeed, with France as the reference, the U.S. applicant dummy is associated with a very large and significant parameter, one of the most significant parameters of the model, suggesting that a patent filed at the EPO by a U.S. applicant is composed of four additional claims and seven additional pages than the average patent application at the EPO. To a lesser extent, other Anglo-Saxon countries also outfit the voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO: patents filed by British, Australian and Canadian applicants include on average one to 3 additional claims and one and a half to 4 additional pages. Some smaller countries such as Israel, Denmark, Korea and Switzerland exhibit similar properties. On the contrary, continental European countries such as Germany, Spain and the Netherlands tend to have less claims and pages. Furthermore, a non-reported regression in which all exogenous variables were interacted with a time trend, allowing the observation of changing effects over time, shows that the value and significance of the country effects have strongly increased over the entire period of observation.

< INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE >

These geographical patterns are illustrated in Figure 3, representing the average size of applications from different countries. From this figure, one can observe two main groups of countries clearly emerging: the first one in the upper right quadrant is mainly composed of Anglo-Saxon countries (the USA, UK, Canada and Australia, as well as two smaller highly specialized countries, Denmark and Israel) and characterized by applications with more claims and pages than the average. The second group, in the lower left quadrant, is made of most continental European countries. It is striking that these two groups of countries essentially differ in that they are mainly governed by Common and Civil Law respectively. This suggests that some of the features of the U.S. patent system reviewed in section 3 may be generalized to the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition at large.³⁰ As hypothesised in section 3, this

³⁰ According to Lundmark (2001), although English contracts are usually shorter than their American cousins, they are still considerably longer on the whole than their continental counterparts. Therefore, the terms ‘English-

may be related to some general features of the Common Law, such as the ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers, the more intense recourse to customization and details in U.S. legal documents, the limited availability of general terms and definitions provided by the law, a higher propensity to litigate associated with a smaller foreseeability of judges’ decisions, the unresponsiveness of the dispute resolution practice in the U.S., and fundamental differences in discovery mechanisms. In addition, patent specific rules and practices in the U.S., such as the restrictions to the application of the doctrine of equivalents (especially by the file history estoppel), the mandatory best mode to be detailed in USPTO applications but not in EPO or JPO ones, and the differences in fee regimes between patent offices may also contribute to these differences.³¹

< INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE >

Even more support for this institutional hypothesis can be found in the estimated parameter of the *USPR* and *USAP* variables, indicating that non U.S. applicants draft longer patents when they target the U.S. market first and then forward their U.S. application to the EPO (with 4 more claims and pages than the average) whereas U.S. applicants file smaller patents when they first file outside the U.S. This confirms that it is probably not the culture of American applicants, but rather the American patent system itself that induces a higher voluminosity, implying patentees applying to the U.S. to specify and formulate their claims with much more details than what the continental European system would require.

Of particular interest in this respect is the case of Japan, since Japanese patents are not particularly composed of more claims but significantly more pages. In other words, Japanese applicants seem to ask for fewer claims than many other countries’ applicants, but include longer descriptions, possibly disclosing more of their inventions. What is more, the *NO_EPL* variable, identifying documents in a non-EPO language (i.e. the number of pages refers to the original PCT publication in another language than English, French or German instead of the EPO one), is associated with one of the most significant but negative parameters of the model, inducing five pages less than the average. As this variable mainly captures Japanese PCT filings published in Japanese, this tends to suggest that the translation of Japanese patents into an official EPO language turns into much larger documents than their original counterparts. Beside the potential effect of language differences in characters and wording space, one possible interpretation could be that the assumed Japanese practice consisting in merging several national priorities into one single filing to the EPO or USPTO does result in files with more pages but not more claims than the average EPO filing.

On top of these national specificities, the PCT dummy is associated in both models with one of the largest and most significant coefficients (by far the most significant in the pages count regression). A patent filed under the PCT option contains indeed a bit more than one claim and almost 15 more pages than the average EPO application. This is highly supportive of the assumption that dominant drafting styles diffuse internationally through the PCT process (although once again the PCT variable is also capturing the format differences evoked here

Speaking’ and ‘Anglo-American’ may be used broadly to refer to the practice in jurisdictions in the Common Law legal family as distinguished from the continental European family.

³¹ While the USPTO applies extra fees for claims in excess of 20, the EPO penalizes claims in excess of 10, hence the fee in the country of priority (and supposedly for which it is initially drafted) may dictate the length of the application when it is filed at the EPO, which is further supported by the frequency distribution of the number of claims, displaying a local mode at 20 (see also van Pottelsberghe and François 2006).

above for the number of pages).³² This effect appears to be growing regarding the number of claims (i.e. its coefficient has increased over time) and constant for the number of pages.

Indeed, since PCT applications generally designate the USPTO, they tend to be mainly drafted in a U.S.-compliant format, for the USA represent the largest market, their granting process is usually shorter, and it is usually easier to remove than to add subject matter, details, or fall-back positions in an application. Such a harmonization of drafting styles has been anticipated by Lundmark (2001) in the sphere of sales contracts due to the increasing diversity in European law, informality of legal transactions, difficulties in enforcement, and distrust of international arbitrators. Hill and King (2004) support a similar anticipation for business contracts in general with a kind of snow-ball effect in detailing the terms of contracts.³³

In other words, PCT filings seem to follow a ‘draft once, file everywhere’ principle, according to which patents are drafted with a U.S. template then applied to all other patent offices. Having expended considerable resources drafting a patent application for one large market, there is a tendency to crib from it when making applications elsewhere. This therefore suggests that the evolution in patent drafting practices may actually result from a progressive harmonization of drafting styles, in favour of American modes, through the internationalization of patenting procedures, namely the emergence of the PCT.

Nonetheless, the fact that PCT filings tend to be so much larger in both dimensions might embed additional factors. As the main benefit of the PCT option is to delay the costs to be incurred in the procedure while the invention gets more mature and the market clearer, it seems reasonable to consider that many PCT applications may be drafted somewhat in a hurry, without a precise view yet on the critical element to claim protection for, especially given the absence of claim-based fees at WIPO. Hence, since it is more difficult to reduce than to enlarge the claimed content of an application once the procedure is started, applicants in such a situation would draft applications in a broader, fuzzier and possibly longer way (as confirmed by the effect of divisional examined here below). The common recourse to office-specific versions of a single claim may also contribute to explain this observed phenomenon.

Technological complexity

The four variables composing the technological complexity hypothesis all appear highly significant and positive determinants of patent voluminosity. In particular, four additional inventors induce one additional claim and four additional pages, suggesting that inventions originating from larger teams are broader and require longer descriptions. This effect could also be embodied in the way patent drafts are fed with information from the research teams, possibly implying each inventor to bring some contribution to the document. Similarly, the number of 8-digit IPC classes characterises potential architectural or complex inventions, which translates into applications with a higher voluminosity. An application linked to 3 more IPC classes is composed of one more claim and 2.5 more pages. Nevertheless, the influence of the number of inventors on patent voluminosity has strongly increased over time whereas the effect of the number of IPC classes has remained constant. Finally, the number of backward patent and non patent citations is also positive and significant in both models. Relying on more patented prior art induces slightly more claims (1 claim for 5 additional citations) and pages (1 page for 10 citations) whereas relying on the scientific literature adds

³² As a reference, this variable also adds slightly more than one page to granted publications the format of which is uniform no matter the filing route.

³³ ‘Once enough people who do not subscribe to the stopping sooner norm enter the community, the norm becomes quite hard to sustain’. Hill and King 2004:926.

one claim every 6 citations and 1 page every 3 citations. All these results suggest that more complex inventions require more claims and more pages to be patented.

Emerging sectors

The sectoral specificities of patent applications also have a strong impact on the voluminosity. With the organic chemistry cluster as the reference, the biotechnology area has the most significant and one of the largest positive effects on the number of claims and pages. On average, a patent application in the biotechnology cluster holds one and a half more claims and more than four additional pages. Of course, genetic sequences included in biotech filings almost surely play a role in this oversized number of pages, but biotech applications also present more textual pages.³⁴ The audio, video and media cluster as well as the computers cluster (and to a lesser extent the telecommunications cluster) present similar effects on both the number of claims and pages. These sectoral effects show in addition a strong trend component when they are interacted with a time trend, suggesting that they have become stronger over time. For the remaining technological areas, some are associated with more claims but with less pages, such as industrial chemistry (with the strongest negative effect on pages), polymers, measuring optics and human necessities. Other sectors are associated with less claims and pages, namely vehicles and civil engineering.

Such technological disparities may take their origin in the relative complexity of the related science, techniques and inventions, or in industry-specific practices. As hypothesized earlier, this may also be related to the relative maturity or immaturity of the established vocabulary within the field, leading to more details and words being needed to fully cover the scope of a new invention.

Patenting strategies

In terms of patenting strategies, the one consisting in merging several priorities to file a single EP application leads to one of the strongest effects on both claims and pages. One additional priority leads indeed to one additional claim and almost two additional pages, probably witnessing that individual priorities may be copy-pasted into a new document.

Of great interest are the two variables (*HASDIV* and *ISDIV*) relating to the filing of divisional applications. As logically expected, applications resulting into multiple divisional filings are much larger on average, with about 4 additional claims and pages. These applications – increasingly common at the EPO – almost surely reveal the more systematic early filing of unfocused inventions, leading to larger documents. But surprisingly enough, the divisional applications themselves have only one fewer claim for even more pages than the average, which suggests that applicants in such a case tend to drop claims but not the state of the art or the description of their invention from the initial filing.

Finally the experience (or lack of experience) of the applicants also influences the drafting of applications, but more significantly in terms of claims than pages, suggesting that it is more in the way they claim protection for their inventions that small and large applicants differ. In particular, larger applicants tend to file patents with fewer claims whereas occasional ones

³⁴ As confirmed by additional non-reported regressions of the number of textual pages alone (i.e. illustrations excluded) as well as of the full number of pages with an additional control variable to account for the presence of drawings in the document.

include slightly more claims into their applications.³⁵ This suggests that more experienced patentees have a capacity to draft their applications in a more focused way while accepting some rules of the disclosure game. To the contrary, applicants with less experience or with fast growing patent portfolios tend to claim for exclusivity rights in a less synthetic way.

Time trend

The trend effect appears very clearly in both estimates, especially for the claims where the time dummies for the early eighties have a negative and significant impact (1988 being the reference year). This negative impact decreases over time and becomes positive in the mid-nineties. A linear trend is highly visible, in terms of both the size of the parameters and their significance. This suggests that there remain some unaccounted for factors, extraneous to our hypotheses that influence the race toward larger and larger patents.

Contributions to the 'workload' growth

The regressions above have identified the determinants of the size of each individual application. It is tempting to use these results in order to understand the dynamics of the average size of applications over the period 1980 to 2000. The coefficients reported in Table 5 give a measure of the importance of the related factors and of their contribution to the number of claims and pages. Nevertheless, a finer measure of these contributions to the growth in voluminosity may be computed at the aggregate level based on the average number of claims or pages in year t :

$$\bar{V}_t = \varepsilon_j F(j, t) + \varepsilon_t + c + e_t \quad (4)$$

Where ε_j are the average elasticities computed for the average filing, c is an intercept and $F(j, t)$ is the average of variable j in year t over the entire population, for instance the share of PCT applications in the total (i.e. the share of applications for which the PCT dummy takes the value 1) or the average number of inventors per application.

The growth of the number of claim or pages between year t_1 and year t_2 therefore writes as follows:

$$\bar{V}_{t_2} - \bar{V}_{t_1} = \varepsilon_j (F(j, t_2) - F(j, t_1)) + (\varepsilon_{t_2} - \varepsilon_{t_1}) + (e_{t_2} - e_{t_1}) \quad (5)$$

The contribution of each variable j is calculated as its elasticity ε_j multiplied by its average change between t_1 and t_2 . The relative contribution of one factor, expressed in percentage, is its absolute contribution divided by the share of total change in the number of claims explained by the model, or:

$$RC_j = \frac{\varepsilon_j (F(j, t_2) - F(j, t_1))}{(\varepsilon_{t_2} - \varepsilon_{t_1}) + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_j (F(j, t_2) - F(j, t_1))} \quad (6)$$

Table 6 provides the contribution of each of the explanatory variables to the growth in the different voluminosity indicators according to equation (6). It suggests that few variables,

³⁵ Note however, that including also the square of the *SIZE* variable into the regression highlights the non-linearity of the relationship since the square gets associated with a positive coefficient and the nominal variable a negative one.

even though they appeared as highly significant determinants of the voluminosity of individual filings, look strong contributors to the actual increase in the voluminosity of EPO filings. In terms of our hypotheses, the major contributor remains the diffusion of national specificities through the PCT route, which altogether contribute to about 15% of the growth in the number of claims and 60% in the number of pages. The PCT variable alone explains 10% of the claims' growth and 58% of the pages' growth (notably thanks to the formatting). But the U.S. applicant dummy contributes 1% of the growth in both indicators and the non-U.S. applicants with a U.S. priority explain about 3% of the increase in claims and 1% of the increase in pages.

< INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE >

From the technological complexity hypothesis, contributing overall about 7% of the increasing voluminosity, the number of inventors remains clearly the most important factor, contributing to 3 to 4% of the increase in claims and pages. The other variables contribute between 1 and 2% each.

The emerging sectors, namely biotechnologies, telecommunications, media and computers contribute together about 5% of the increase in claims and 3% of the increase in pages. The patenting strategy hypothesis contributes virtually not at all to the growth in voluminosity, except maybe for the number of priorities (*PRIO*) and the issuance of divisionals (*HASDIV*), which explain about 1% of the growth each. Although their coefficients have opposite signs, serial and occasional applicants are in fact both negative contributors to the increase in the number of claims.

5. Concluding remarks

The size and length (or voluminosity) of patent applications at the EPO has drastically increased over the past 20 years, presumably revealing an increasing propensity of patentees to claim more exclusive rights on their inventions or to adapt their drafting styles to changing legal, technological and market conditions. This phenomenon raises serious questions on the ability of patent offices to master their workload while upholding high standards of quality in the granting process.

The objective of this paper was to identify the sources of this phenomenon through an in-depth quantitative analysis of all patent filings at the EPO since 1982. The analysis investigated two dimensions of voluminosity: the number of claims and the number of pages in each filing. It consisted in testing four broad hypotheses to explain what factors have influenced these dimensions over the past two decades.

The four hypotheses (the diffusion of national practices, the technological complexity, emerging sectors and patenting strategies) all play some role in explaining the voluminosity of patent applications, but to different extents, and a larger one for the number of pages than for the number of claims. A significant trend effect also appears next to the hypotheses, especially for the claims.

The results have highlighted some interesting – although not so surprising – effects. First, emerging sectors (namely biotechs, computer science, and audio, video and media technologies) with less established vocabulary and practices lead to larger patent applications than more traditional areas such as industrial chemistry, polymers, vehicles, or civil engineering. Such disparities may take their origin in the relative complexity of the related

science, techniques and inventions, or in industry-specific practices leading for instance to the premature filing of unfocused inventions. Second, the complexity of an invention and of the research process leading to it induces larger documents as well. Architectural inventions, made by large teams of researchers, and heavily relying on the state of the art seem to require more description and claims to be disclosed and protected. And thirdly, strategies consisting in filing unfocused patents later split into several divisional filings is an increasingly common practice that also contributes to the growth in the size of applications filed at the EPO. This may also be one of the motivations driving the increasing success of the PCT.

The results presented here have two important implications. First, they reveal fundamental differences in patent drafting styles between Civil and Common Law countries, with the latter system clearly leading to much larger patents on average. The difference in size between North American and continental European commercial contracts for instance – observed and investigated by several law scholars – further supports the idea that the Common Law system induces larger documents than the Civil Law one does. In addition, some specificities of the U.S. patent system, namely restrictions to the application of the doctrine of equivalent (notably by the prosecution history estoppel), the mandatory best mode, and differences in fee regimes between the USPTO and the EPO, underline these institutional influences on patent drafting styles.

Second, the internationalization of patenting procedures and the increasing success of the Patent Cooperation Treaty has led to the harmonization of drafting styles around the world in favour of the U.S. model. Following a kind of ‘**draft once, file everywhere**’ principle, patentees seem to opt for an American template as soon as they plan to file their application internationally. This diffusion of U.S. compliant drafting styles into Europe has a major aftermath on the European patent system. This also suggests that the observed inflation in patent drafting may to a large extent be due to changes in patent systems and technology markets and not only to a real increase in the average scope of protection claimed.

However, there still remains a significant unexplained trend in the increase of the voluminosity of patent applications. This trend may ultimately witness an inexorable path towards more complexity, towards more complete, detailed, complex and hence voluminous literature in every field of activity, such as the user manuals of electronic devices, the documentation of mass-market consumer goods, official or technical reports, or even laws. Patents may be just another playground for this generalized verbosity, encouraged by the decreasing costs of drafting and disseminating written information. Or it may reflect additional strategic factors, related to the intensification of competition on markets (and in courts), which are not captured by the model presented here.

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
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Appendixes


Figure A1 – Average number of pages in Euro-Direct and PCT applications at EPO (1980-2002)



Source – own calculations based on EPO data


Tables and figures

Figure 1 – Average number of claims and pages in incoming applications at EPO (1980-2004)




Source – own calculations based on EPO data

Figure 2 – Frequency distribution of claims and pages (1988-2002)



Source – own calculations based on EPO data

Figure 3 – Average voluminosity of EPO applications according to priority country



Source – own calculations based on EPO data (applications filed to the EPO in 2002)

Table 1 - Summary statistics of voluminosity indicators (endogenous variables)

Variable	Period	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Mode	Median	Annual Growth
# Claims at filing	1982-2004	1 551 459	14,60	12,08	1	651	10	11	2,5%
# Claims at filing	1988-2002	1 147 567	14,74	12,11	1	592	10	11	3,2%
# Pages at filing	1988-2003	1 136 677	21,45	35,95	1	9786	6	13	5,3%

Source – own calculations based on EPO data

Table 2 - Summary statistics of exogenous variables (1)

Variable	Type	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	(2)
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference for countries = France)							
PCT Filing	DUM	1 551 769	0,380	0,49	0	1	9,85%
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority	DUM	1 551 769	0,035	0,18	0	1	6,72%
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority	DUM	1 551 769	0,016	0,13	0	1	0,19%
AT Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,010	0,10	0	1	0,50%
AU Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,007	0,08	0	1	1,15%
BE Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,009	0,10	0	1	1,62%
CA Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,012	0,11	0	1	2,66%
CH Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,036	0,19	0	1	-1,60%
DE Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,199	0,40	0	1	-0,84%
DK Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,007	0,08	0	1	3,17%
ES Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,005	0,07	0	1	7,52%
FI Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,010	0,10	0	1	7,61%
FR Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,075	0,26	0	1	-1,76%
GB Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,052	0,22	0	1	-3,43%
IL Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,005	0,07	0	1	9,90%
IT Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,033	0,18	0	1	1,05%
JP Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,179	0,38	0	1	1,33%
KR Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,008	0,09	0	1	32,04%
NL Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,037	0,19	0	1	0,89%
SE Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,021	0,14	0	1	-0,13%
U.S. Applicant	DUM	1 551 769	0,289	0,45	0	1	0,29%
Applicant from the ROW	DUM	1 551 769	0,024	0,15	0	1	3,38%
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language	DUM	1 551 769	0,077	0,27	0	1	5,25%
H2: Technological complexity							
# Inventors	DISC	1 551 769	2,407	1,77	0	53	1,36%
# IPC-7	DISC	1 534 018	1,921	1,33	1	49	0,40%
# Backward Patent Citations	DISC	1 461 657	4,530	2,89	0	125	0,50%
# Non Patent Citations	DISC	1 461 657	0,953	1,84	0	170	2,74%
H3 Emerging sectors							
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry	DUM	1 551 769	0,113	0,32	0	1	-1,73%
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry	DUM	1 551 769	0,136	0,34	0	1	-0,69%
JC-03 - Polymers	DUM	1 551 769	0,094	0,29	0	1	-1,43%
JC-04 - Biotechnology	DUM	1 551 769	0,121	0,33	0	1	2,32%
JC-05 - Telecommunications	DUM	1 551 769	0,052	0,22	0	1	7,18%
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media	DUM	1 551 769	0,049	0,22	0	1	3,21%
JC-07 - Electronics	DUM	1 551 769	0,074	0,26	0	1	-0,16%
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines	DUM	1 551 769	0,108	0,31	0	1	-0,71%
JC-09 - Computers	DUM	1 551 769	0,048	0,21	0	1	4,61%
JC-10 - Measuring Optics	DUM	1 551 769	0,089	0,29	0	1	-0,32%
JC-11 - Handling & Processing	DUM	1 551 769	0,125	0,33	0	1	-1,35%
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology	DUM	1 551 769	0,099	0,30	0	1	0,13%
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics	DUM	1 551 769	0,089	0,28	0	1	-0,84%
JC-14 - Human Necessities	DUM	1 551 769	0,111	0,31	0	1	0,67%
H4: Patenting strategies							
# Priorities	DISC	1 551 769	1,171	1,29	0	482	0,23%
Application has issued divisionals	DUM	1 543 076	0,020	0,14	0	1	12,14%
Application is a divisional	DUM	1 543 076	0,024	0,15	0	1	13,68%
# Cumulative Filings (5 years)	DISC	1 551 743	420,664	1082,48	0	11 111	4,39%
Occasional (no filing in 4 prev. yrs)	DUM	1 551 743	0,234	0,42	0	1	-1,57%
Year of filing							
1982	DUM	1 551 769	0,018	0,13	0	1	
1983	DUM	1 551 769	0,020	0,14	0	1	
1984	DUM	1 551 769	0,023	0,15	0	1	
1985	DUM	1 551 769	0,025	0,15	0	1	
1986	DUM	1 551 769	0,027	0,16	0	1	
1987	DUM	1 551 769	0,029	0,17	0	1	
1988	DUM	1 551 769	0,034	0,18	0	1	
1989	DUM	1 551 769	0,037	0,19	0	1	
1990	DUM	1 551 769	0,041	0,20	0	1	
1991	DUM	1 551 769	0,038	0,19	0	1	
1992	DUM	1 551 769	0,039	0,19	0	1	
1993	DUM	1 551 769	0,039	0,19	0	1	
1994	DUM	1 551 769	0,040	0,20	0	1	
1995	DUM	1 551 769	0,042	0,20	0	1	
1996	DUM	1 551 769	0,046	0,21	0	1	
1997	DUM	1 551 769	0,051	0,22	0	1	
1998	DUM	1 551 769	0,058	0,23	0	1	
1999	DUM	1 551 769	0,063	0,24	0	1	
2000	DUM	1 551 769	0,069	0,25	0	1	
2001	DUM	1 551 769	0,072	0,26	0	1	
2002	DUM	1 551 769	0,071	0,26	0	1	
2003	DUM	1 551 769	0,071	0,26	0	1	
2004	DUM	1 551 769	0,047	0,21	0	1	

DUM = Dummy variable | DISC = Discrete variable

(1) International PCT filings excluded

(2) Average annual growth rates of the variable or the share of filings concerned in case of dummy variables

Table 3 - List of exogenous variables

H1: national practices and internationalization of patenting procedures hypothesis:

<i>PCT</i>	a dummy equal to 1 for PCT applications and 0 otherwise
<i>USPR</i>	a dummy equal to 1 for filings with a U.S. priority applied by a non-U.S. applicant
<i>USAP</i>	a dummy equal to 1 for filings with a non-U.S. priority applied by a U.S. applicant
<i>APP_XX</i>	19 country dummies (18 major countries of applicants + Rest of the World)
<i>NO_EPL</i>	a dummy equal to 1 for applications filed in another language than the three official EPO languages (DE, EN or FR) (mainly concerns Japanese applications filed in Japanese)

H2: the technological complexity hypothesis

<i>INV</i>	the number of inventors
<i>IPC8</i>	the number of 8-digit IPC classes listed
<i>BPC</i>	the number of backward patent citations
<i>NPC</i>	the number of non-patent backward citations

H3: the emerging sectors hypothesis: 14 dummies (1 for each EPO Joint Cluster)

H4: the strategic patenting hypothesis (5 variables)

<i>PRIO</i>	the number of priority applications listed in the patent filing
<i>HASDIV</i>	a dummy equal to 1 if the application led to one or more divisionals and 0 otherwise
<i>ISDIV</i>	a dummy equal to 1 for divisional applications and 0 otherwise
<i>SIZE</i>	the cumulative number of applications filed by the applicant in the same year and the 4 previous years on top of the current application
<i>OCCAS</i>	a dummy equal to 1 if the applicant had no other filing in the current and 4 previous years

H0: 23 time dummies (ranging from 1982 to 2004) to control for the effect of time

**Table 4 – Explanatory power of the 4 hypotheses
(Adjusted R² of the OLS models)**

Hypothesis	Claims	Pages
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures	0,11	0,12
H2: Technological complexity	0,05	0,11
H3: Emerging sectors	0,03	0,07
H4: Patenting strategies	0,03	0,07
H0: Trend	0,03	0,02
H1+H2	0,14	0,20
H1+H2+H3	0,15	0,22
H1+H2+H3+H4	0,17	0,25
H1+H2+H3+H4+H0	0,18	0,26

*Estimates run on the same sample for claims and pages counts
Period: 1988-2002 - 1,092,164 observations*

Table 5 – Econometric estimates of equation E1 (Negative Binomial Regression)

	Claims 1982-2004			Pages 1988-2002		
	Coef.	ε (1)	z	Coef.	ε (1)	z
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference for countries = France)						
PCT Filing	0,27	1,25	70,49 (**)	1,29	14,78	520,17 (**)
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority	0,68	4,26	77,83 (**)	0,37	4,10	62,03 (**)
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority	-0,57	-1,98	-46,88 (**)	-0,35	-2,81	-44,94 (**)
AT Applicant	-0,07	-0,31	-4,47 (**)	-0,19	-1,59	-16,36 (**)
AU Applicant	0,58	3,53	30,57 (**)	0,38	4,34	29,91 (**)
BE Applicant	0,16	0,78	9,76 (**)	0,33	3,67	29,62 (**)
CA Applicant	0,38	2,09	24,69 (**)	0,38	4,36	36,54 (**)
CH Applicant	0,23	1,17	24,28 (**)	0,17	1,71	25,35 (**)
DE Applicant	-0,04	-0,18	-6,29 (**)	-0,09	-0,85	-21,19 (**)
DK Applicant	0,30	1,54	14,95 (**)	0,36	4,13	28,37 (**)
ES Applicant	-0,68	-2,23	-28,69 (**)	0,02	0,23	1,46
FI Applicant	0,10	0,47	5,99 (**)	0,10	0,94	8,81 (**)
GB Applicant	0,30	1,55	35,78 (**)	0,16	1,60	27,80 (**)
IL Applicant	0,51	2,96	22,30 (**)	0,59	7,59	40,19 (**)
IT Applicant	-0,03	-0,14	-3,17 (**)	0,10	1,03	14,15 (**)
JP Applicant	0,05	0,23	7,53 (**)	0,99	13,20	214,73 (**)
KR Applicant	0,19	0,92	10,07 (**)	0,50	6,00	38,67 (**)
NL Applicant	-0,12	-0,50	-12,21 (**)	-0,07	-0,62	-10,38 (**)
SE Applicant	0,04	0,18	3,18 (**)	0,18	1,86	22,07 (**)
U.S. Applicant	0,77	4,16	125,06 (**)	0,67	7,36	160,31 (**)
Applicant from the ROW	0,08	0,39	7,18 (**)	0,19	1,96	24,38 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language				-0,68	-4,92	-147,60 (**)
H2: Technological complexity						
# Inventors	0,06	0,26	61,93 (**)	0,10	0,98	170,17 (**)
# IPC-7	0,07	0,33	58,41 (**)	0,09	0,85	115,62 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations	0,05	0,22	87,41 (**)	0,01	0,14	41,63 (**)
# Non Patent Citations	0,04	0,17	40,06 (**)	0,04	0,36	67,10 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)						
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry	0,03	0,13	5,34 (**)	-0,35	-2,86	-99,28 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers	0,07	0,34	13,26 (**)	-0,01	-0,13	-3,66 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology	0,31	1,55	53,34 (**)	0,40	4,37	105,86 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications	0,29	1,46	37,23 (**)	0,07	0,66	13,74 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media	0,35	1,85	45,90 (**)	0,21	2,13	42,21 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics	0,04	0,19	6,73 (**)	0,02	0,16	4,16 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines	0,00	0,02	0,85	-0,22	-1,87	-59,75 (**)
JC-09 - Computers	0,33	1,72	42,33 (**)	0,39	4,42	77,39 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics	0,08	0,39	15,17 (**)	-0,11	-1,01	-30,39 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing	-0,02	-0,09	-3,72 (**)	-0,23	-1,96	-63,76 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology	-0,21	-0,87	-36,36 (**)	-0,34	-2,77	-86,20 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics	-0,15	-0,65	-25,16 (**)	-0,30	-2,49	-72,22 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities	0,08	0,39	15,67 (**)	-0,17	-1,47	-45,82 (**)
H4: Patenting strategies						
# Priorities	0,25	1,14	115,72 (**)	0,21	1,94	146,30 (**)
Application has issued divisionals	0,62	3,78	58,28 (**)	0,38	4,35	61,14 (**)
Application is a divisional	-0,22	-0,89	-20,51 (**)	0,59	7,43	87,06 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3)	-0,06	-0,26	-37,39 (**)	-0,01	-0,05	-4,97 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev. yrs)	0,10	0,48	27,01 (**)	0,02	0,18	7,22 (**)
Year of filing (Reference = 1988)						
1982	-0,23		-15,68 (**)			
1983	-0,18		-12,55 (**)			
1984	-0,14		-10,61 (**)			
1985	-0,12		-8,96 (**)			
1986	-0,10		-8,10 (**)			
1987	-0,06		-4,51 (**)			
1989	0,04		3,29 (**)	0,01		1,37
1990	0,06		5,10 (**)	0,04		5,81 (**)
1991	0,07		5,70 (**)	0,08		11,75 (**)
1992	0,05		4,24 (**)	0,10		15,14 (**)
1993	0,10		8,42 (**)	0,12		18,44 (**)
1994	0,15		12,75 (**)	0,14		20,34 (**)
1995	0,17		14,88 (**)	0,13		19,42 (**)
1996	0,23		20,74 (**)	0,16		23,96 (**)
1997	0,30		27,83 (**)	0,17		25,70 (**)
1998	0,36		33,85 (**)	0,17		27,37 (**)
1999	0,45		42,65 (**)	0,20		31,33 (**)
2000	0,52		49,64 (**)	0,23		37,72 (**)
2001	0,60		57,46 (**)	0,25		40,88 (**)
2002	0,66		62,67 (**)	0,32		51,23 (**)
2003	0,72		68,60 (**)			
2004	0,76		63,74 (**)			
Constant	-0,08		-7,05 (**)	0,51		72,05 (**)
F-Stat / Log likelihood		-3,53E+06			-3,62E+06	
LN(alpha) [S.E.]		1,14 [0,002]			-0,01 [0,002]	
LR Test of alpha=0		10,00E+06 (**)			11,00E+06 (**)	
# Observations		1 454 552			1 092 164	

Significativity level: (*) $p < 5\%$ - (**) $p < 1\%$

(1) Marginal elasticities computed for a hypothetical patent characterized by all explanatory variables equal to their average value at dy/dx . Takes into account discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

Table 6 - Contributions of endogenous variables to the growth in number of claims

Exogenous variables	Claims 1982-2004				Pages 1988-2002			
	Nominal Growth	ϵ (1)	Contrib.	R.C.	Nominal Growth	ϵ (1)	Contrib.	R.C.
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference for countries = France)								
PCT Filing	0,50	1,25	0,62	10%	0,44	14,78	6,44	58%
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority	0,04	4,26	0,18	3%	0,04	4,10	0,15	1%
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority	0,00	-1,98	0,00	0%	0,00	-2,81	0,00	0%
AT Applicant	0,00	-0,31	0,00	0%	0,00	-1,59	0,00	0%
AU Applicant	0,00	3,53	0,00	0%	0,00	4,34	0,00	0%
BE Applicant	0,00	0,78	0,00	0%	0,00	3,67	0,00	0%
CA Applicant	0,00	2,09	0,01	0%	0,00	4,36	0,02	0%
CH Applicant	-0,01	1,17	-0,02	0%	0,00	1,71	0,00	0%
DE Applicant	-0,04	-0,18	0,01	0%	-0,02	-0,85	0,02	0%
DK Applicant	0,00	1,54	0,01	0%	0,00	4,13	0,01	0%
ES Applicant	0,01	-2,23	-0,01	0%	0,00	0,23	0,00	0%
FI Applicant	0,01	0,47	0,01	0%	0,01	0,94	0,01	0%
GB Applicant	-0,04	1,55	-0,07	-1%	-0,02	1,60	-0,04	0%
IL Applicant	0,01	2,96	0,02	0%	0,00	7,59	0,03	0%
IT Applicant	0,01	-0,14	0,00	0%	0,00	1,03	0,00	0%
JP Applicant	0,04	0,23	0,01	0%	-0,01	13,20	-0,11	-1%
KR Applicant	0,01	0,92	0,01	0%	0,01	6,00	0,09	1%
NL Applicant	0,00	-0,50	0,00	0%	0,00	-0,62	0,00	0%
SE Applicant	0,00	0,18	0,00	0%	0,00	1,86	0,01	0%
U.S. Applicant	0,01	4,16	0,04	1%	0,01	7,36	0,10	1%
Applicant from the ROW	0,02	0,39	0,01	0%	0,01	1,96	0,02	0%
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language					0,05	-4,92	-0,27	-2%
H2: Technological complexity								
# Inventors	0,63	0,26	0,17	3%	0,40	0,98	0,39	4%
# IPC-7	0,17	0,33	0,06	1%	0,16	0,85	0,14	1%
# Backward Patent Citations	0,56	0,22	0,12	2%	0,77	0,14	0,10	1%
# Non Patent Citations	0,49	0,17	0,08	1%	0,20	0,36	0,07	1%
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference=JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)								
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry	-0,04	0,13	-0,01	0%	-0,03	-2,86	0,08	1%
JC-03 - Polymers	-0,03	0,34	-0,01	0%	-0,03	-0,13	0,00	0%
JC-04 - Biotechnology	0,05	1,55	0,08	1%	0,03	4,37	0,12	1%
JC-05 - Telecommunications	0,06	1,46	0,09	1%	0,06	0,66	0,04	0%
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media	0,03	1,85	0,05	1%	0,02	2,13	0,05	0%
JC-07 - Electronics	0,00	0,19	0,00	0%	0,00	0,16	0,00	0%
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines	-0,01	0,02	0,00	0%	-0,01	-1,87	0,02	0%
JC-09 - Computers	0,04	1,72	0,07	1%	0,04	4,42	0,17	2%
JC-10 - Measuring Optics	0,00	0,39	0,00	0%	-0,01	-1,01	0,01	0%
JC-11 - Handling & Processing	-0,04	-0,09	0,00	0%	-0,04	-1,96	0,07	1%
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology	0,00	-0,87	0,00	0%	0,00	-2,77	0,00	0%
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics	-0,02	-0,65	0,01	0%	0,00	-2,49	0,01	0%
JC-14 - Human Necessities	0,01	0,39	0,00	0%	0,00	-1,47	0,00	0%
H4: Patenting strategies								
# Priorities	0,05	1,14	0,06	1%	-0,02	1,94	-0,03	0%
Application has issued divisionals	0,01	3,78	0,03	1%	0,00	4,35	-0,01	0%
Application is a divisional	0,01	-0,89	-0,01	0%	0,00	7,43	-0,02	0%
# Cumulative Filings (5 years) (Coef. *1000)	329,09	-0,26	-0,09	-1%	227,71	-0,05	-0,01	0%
Occasional (no filing in 4 prev. yrs)	-0,07	0,48	-0,04	-1%	-0,04	0,18	-0,01	0%
Year of filing (Reference=1988)								
Trend		4,92	4,92	77%		3,33	3,33	30%

(1) Marginal elasticities computed for a hypothetical patent characterized by all explanatory variables equal to their average value at dy/dx . Takes into account discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1