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European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

A CEPR Symposium,

            Gerzensee, 3/14 July 2000

Monday 3 July
08.30 - 10.00	Strategic Experimentation with Public or Private Information Martin Cripps (University of Warwick) Godfrey Keller (London School of Economics)* Sven Rady (Universität München, Stanford University, and CEPR)
20.30 - 21.30	Entry Deterrence in Durable Goods Monopoly Heidrun Hoppe (Universität Hamburg) In Ho Lee (University of Southampton)*
20.30 - 21.30	Modelling Financial Fragility in Emerging and Transition Economies Jeffrey H Nilsen (Studienzentrum Gerzensee and Copenhagen Business School) Riccardo Rovelli (Università di Bologna)*
Tuesday 4 July
08.30 - 12.15	Focus Session: Microeconomic Models of Financial Crises
	Optimal Currency Crises Franklin Allen (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)   Douglas Gale (New York University)
	Demand Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs Itay Goldstein (Bank of Israel and Tel Aviv University) Ady Pauzner (Tel Aviv University)
20.30 - 21.30	Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System Figures from this paper are available as a separate file. Douglas Gale (New York University) Xavier Vives (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona, and CEPR)*
20.30 - 21.30	Delegated Portfolio Management, No Churning, and Relative Performance-Based Incentive/Sorting Schemes Sudipto Bhattacharya (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Wednesday 5 July
08.30 - 10.00	Professional Advice A second paper that relates to this presentation is also available Marco Ottaviani (University College London) Peter Sørensen (University of Copenhagen)*
20.30 - 21.30	Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium Selection Device Martin Lettau (Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR) Timothy Van Zandt (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)*
20.30 - 21.30	Speculative Attacks: Unique Sunspot Equilibrium and Transparency   Frank Heinemann (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt-am-Main)* Gerhard Illing (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt-am-Main)
Thursday 6 July
08.30 - 12.15	Focus Session: Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises
	Nominal Debt and the Dynamics of Currency Crises (survey) Giancarlo Corsetti (Yale University and CEPR) Bartosz Maćkoswiak (Yale University)
	Third Generation Models of Currency Crises (survey) Philippe Bacchetta (Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Université de Lausanne and CEPR)
	Financial Crises as Herds V V Chari (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) Patrick Kehoe (University of Pennsylvania and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)*
Friday 7 July
08.30 - 10.00	Why are Housing Prices so Volatile? Income Shocks in a Stochastic Model with Heterogeneous Agents François Ortalo-Magné (London School of Economics and CEPR) Sven Rady (Universität München, Stanford University, and CEPR)*
Monday 10 July
08.30 - 09.45	The Employment Relation and the Theory of the Firm: Arm’s Length Contracting versus Authority Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)* Ashvin Rajan (Princeton University)
10.15 - 11.30	Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)
10.15 - 11.30	Performance Incentives with Award Constraints Pascal Courty (London Business School and CEPR)* Gerald Marschke (State University of New York, Albany)
20.30 - 21.30	The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments Anke Kessler (Universität Bonn and CEPR)* Christoph Lülfesmann (Universität Bonn)
20.30 - 21.30	The Power of a Strategic Buyer with Perfect and Imperfect Monitoring V Bhaskar (University of Essex)
Tuesday 11 July
08.30 - 12.15	Focus Session on: Personnel Economics
	The Future of Personnel Economics Edward P Lazear (Hoover Institute, Stanford University)
	Ownership and Incentives George Baker (Harvard University)
	Top Management Compensation and Incentives: Executive Compensation Kevin J Murphy (University of Southern California)
20.30 - 21.30	Competing for Ownership Patrick Legros (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université de Liège and CEPR)* Andrew Newman (University College London)
20.30 - 21.30	Capacity Constrained Firms in (Labor) Markets with Adverse Selection A second paper that relates to this presentation is also available Roman Inderst (Universität Mannheim) Achim Wambach (Universität München and CEPR)*
Wednesday 12 July
08.30 - 12.15	Focus Session: Multiparty Contracting
	Overview of Multiparty Contracting Ilya Segal (Stanford University) Michael Whinston (University of Chicago)
	Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities The figures for this paper are available as a separate file Ilya Segal (Stanford University) Michael Whinston (University of Chicago)
	Games Played Through Agents Andrea Prat (STICERD, London School of Economics and CEPR) Aldo Rustichini (Boston University)*
20.30 - 21.30	Central Governance or Subsidiarity: A Property-Rights Approach to Federalism Christoph Lülfesmann (Universität Bonn)
20.30 - 21.30	Increasing Lock-in to Facilitate Decision-Making: A Property Rights Theory of the Firm with Private Information Niko Matouschek (CEP, London School of Economics)
Thursday 13 July
08.30 - 09.45	When are Economies with Asymmetric Information Walrasian ? Alberto Bisin (New York University)*   Piero Gottardi (University of Venice) Danilo Guaitilo (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)
10.15 - 11.30	Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting with Unobservable Cash Flows Peter DeMarzo (University of California, Berkeley)* Mike Fishman (Northwestern University)
10.15 - 11.30	Market Size and Firm Turnover (Part 1: Theory) Marcus Asplund (Stockhom School of Economics) Volker Nocke (Nuffield College, Oxford)*
20.30 - 21.30	Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital Market Discipline Roman Inderst (Universität Mannheim) Holger M Müller (Universität Mannheim)*
10.15 - 11.30	The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations Alessandro Lizzeri (Princeton University) Margaret A Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)* Nicola Persico (University of Pennsylvania)
Friday 14 July
08.30 - 09.45	Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)* Kevin J Roberts (Nuffield College, Oxford)

The views expressed in these papers are those of the author(s) and not those of the funding organization(s), nor of CEPR which takes no institutional policy positions.