

# Agriculture: the Dog that Didn't Bark?

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When talking about signs of the resurgence of protectionism in response to global recession, it would appear strange not to feature agriculture. After all, that sector has for the post-war period been the poster-child for government policies that distort markets in favour of domestic producers. Most explanations of agricultural protectionism focus on the unusual political sensitivity of farming and food production: coupled with uncertain world market conditions the case for stimulating high-cost domestic output has been irresistible for countries that can afford such luxuries. World agriculture has just gone through another phase of major uncertainty on global commodity markets, with prices of some agricultural products rising to extreme levels in 2007 and the first half of 2008, triggering what has been described as another global food crisis. As commodity prices, including agricultural products, declined sharply in the second half of 2008, not the least as a result of the economic and financial crisis, it would appear only 'natural' to find that governments around the globe have responded by shielding their domestic farmers from these 'detrimental' market forces. After all, when all sorts of policy action is designed to provide stimulus to ailing economies, politically powerful farm lobbies can easily be imagined to pressurize governments into providing protection to farmers as well in these difficult times.

However, based on evidence available so far it appears that the response to the current economic crisis has not (yet?) included any major policy shifts toward agricultural protectionism. In an historical context this fact is remarkable. This paper takes a look at the relatively limited policy action taken in agriculture, and attempts to explain why on this occasion "the dog did not bark".

## 1 The Evidence

Government action in the food and agricultural sector, in response to the financial and economic crisis, can come in different forms, depending on the principal motivation behind the measure and its implementation. Four major categories of policy action can be identified:

- New border measures in favour of domestic producers in the food and agriculture sector.

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- Quasi-automatic application of counter-cyclical measures included in pre-existing programmes.
- New explicit action in favour of domestic consumers (or other users) of food and agricultural products.
- Financial stimulus programmes targeting agriculture and food.

These four categories of government action can be identified in the various lists of trade-related measures taken by governments that have become available in the last few months.<sup>2</sup> The table below (and the detail included in the Annex Table) is based mainly on the list appended to the report of the WTO's Director General to the Trade Policy Review Body (WTO 2009).<sup>3</sup> A second source of information used is the World Bank, which maintains an unpublished list of trade-related measures (World Bank 2009a) and has issued a Fact Sheet on measures taken by the G20 countries (World Bank 2009b). The World Bank lists report a number of cases in which governments have made proposals or pledges, without providing information on whether these measures have actually been implemented. These cases are not included in the list below, so there may be some under-counting of government actions.

The table below classifies forty-three trade-related actions plausibly associated with economic crisis management. The most frequent **new border measures** come in the form of tariff increases: nine countries are reported to have used trade measures directly to assist producers. Ecuador, Turkey and the Russian Federation each imposed a tariff increase on a wide range of goods, including foodstuffs. Other countries have been more specific: China removed interim tariff reductions on soybean products and India imposed a duty on soybean oil. South Korea imposed a tariff on flour. Belarus imposed higher duties on Russian goods, though presumably not entirely as a result of the economic environment.

In four cases, new or more stringent SPS measures have also been reported, including a ban on Irish pork by China, and on US pork (from certain facilities) by Russia. Indonesia introduced a new import inspection regime that limited entry points. It is obviously difficult to determine whether these are measures responding to the economic recession or whether they would have been introduced in any case.

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<sup>2</sup> We omit the programs that benefit farmers along with other segments of the population. Stimulus programs generally available, as well as programs to facilitate trade and improve the availability of export credit may have significant advantages for agriculture along with other export sectors but are not discussed here.

<sup>3</sup> In the WTO list, a distinction is made between "verified information" and "non-verified information". That distinction is not reported here.

Table: Incidence of Government Actions in the Area of Agriculture and Food

<i>Category of Measure</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>	<i>Number of Actions</i>	<i>Examples</i>
New Border Measures	15	19	Increase in Import taxes (9) AD and CVD measures (3) SPS measures (2) Elimination of export taxes (4) Increase in export subsidies (2)
Counter-cyclical Measures under existing legislation	1	2	Re-introduction of import duties (1) Re-introduction of export subsidies (1)
Consumer Protection Measures	7	9	Reduction in Import Taxes (5) Removal of SPS Measures (2) Introduction of export taxes (2)
Financial Stimulus to the Farm Sector	12	13	Funds for rural development (1) Increased price support (3) Input subsidies (2) Income support (3) Improved rural credit (4)

Source: Annex Table

The same doubts hold regarding the three anti-dumping or countervailing duties reported in this category, as they might also have been imposed even in the absence of the crisis. Egypt imposed anti-dumping duties on sugar. The EU imposed anti-dumping duties on fruits from China, and both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on bio-diesel imports from the US, though the latter case has been simmering for some time.

There are four cases in which export taxes have been reduced or eliminated in part as a response to the economic crisis. Argentina eliminated several export taxes, as did India on Basmati rice exports, Indonesia on palm oil and Vietnam also on rice exports. In each case these actions remove taxes imposed a few months earlier to keep domestic prices down. Export assistance has been given by India for textiles and leather goods, and by Vietnam for a range of products.

Only two instances of a WTO member employing a **quasi-automatic counter-cyclical trade measure** already authorized in pre-existing legislation is recorded in the list. In each case, the EU re-introduced trade measures that had been suspended at the time of high prices. Cereal duties came back as world prices declined, and export subsidies for dairy products also resurfaced – to the disappointment of overseas competitors. But it is difficult to see how the EU could have avoided these moves without in effect repudiating its own agricultural policy.

The absence in the list of actions of other cases of counter-cyclical measures, applied at the border or in the form of domestic subsidies, undoubtedly understates the importance of this category of action. Many countries' agricultural policy regimes include measures that automatically provide additional support or protection to domestic farmers when market prices decline.<sup>4</sup> The wide-spread use of such counter-cyclical measures in agricultural policy packages of the OECD countries is evident in the year-to-year fluctuations of the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) as reported by the OECD (e.g. OECD, 2008) which moves inversely with the level of international market prices of agricultural products. Falling international prices of agricultural commodities after the 2008 food crisis have resulted in higher levels of domestic support and/or border protection in these countries. Because of the automatic nature of these regimes, the respective policy action often does not require any explicit government decision. It is probably for that reason that most of the counter-cyclical policy action is not reported in the media. Yet, the economic implications of the respective (implicit) policy action can be significant. For example, the World Bank reports an estimate according to which "US overall trade distorting subsidies [in agriculture] of about \$8.1 billion in 2008 are likely to rise to \$9.9 billion in 2009 if current price projections materialize" (Gamberoni and Newfarmer, 2009).

Besides measures obviously providing protection and support to domestic farmers, there has also been some action pointing in the opposite direction, i.e. exerting downward pressure on domestic prices of agricultural products. A number of such cases of **new explicit action in favour of domestic consumers** (or other users) of food and agricultural products have been evident in the past few months. Nine cases of this nature are included in the table. Import tariff reductions have been reported in five instances, though several other countries had lowered tariffs earlier as a response to high commodity prices. Of the new measures noted in recent months, Ecuador reduced tariffs on a range of imported raw materials. India abolished tariffs on soybean oil and sugar, and the Philippines reduced tariffs on wheat, soybeans and distillers dried grains (an animal feed). Tunisia also is reported to have made widespread tariff reductions. Resolutions of SPS problems have also occurred in a couple of instances, as Japan lifted a ban on Chilean pork and South Korea agreed to resume imports of US beef. India

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<sup>4</sup> Deficiency payments, under which a subsidy is paid that bridges the gap between a pre-determined domestic target price and the actual market price, are a typical example of such regimes. While they operate in the domestic market, variable import tariffs (below the bound tariff) and export subsidies apply at the border.

introduced export taxes on leather goods and Russia, also, has increased export taxes for leather products. Though generally operating in the direction of more liberal trade in agriculture (except where export taxes were raised), in a number of cases these measures have the effect of benefiting domestic producers in sectors that use agricultural products as inputs.

**Stimulus programmes** have not commonly targeted agriculture, though farmers have of course benefited from more general schemes such as tax rebates. This may in itself reflect the reduced importance of agriculture in the economy of those countries that have the ability to make these generous transfers. In the 1930s it was believed that recessions were “farm led and farm fed” implying that the health of the rural economy was an important factor in wider economic picture. This was an important motive behind the introduction of farm price-support policies at that time. But the absence of any major schemes to prop up rural incomes as a way of rescuing the economy suggests that this avenue is less attractive nowadays.

However there have been some thirteen examples of stimulus payments aimed at rural incomes. This category includes various forms of domestic subsidies. The stimulus package introduced by China contains a significant increase in spending on agricultural programs, though reportedly still within the constraints of the WTO schedule for that country. The EU introduced as a part of a stimulus package an increase in funds aimed at rural development, and several member states of the EU provided modest additional funds of their own. India raised cotton price supports and Sri Lanka added a fertilizer subsidy, though it is possible that some of these payments could have been made even without a widespread economic crisis – and indeed might have been more generous if there had not been other competing uses for government funds. One aspect of the stimulus programs has been the freeing up of the credit markets: several countries have targeted agricultural credit, including Brazil, Poland, Russia and Spain as a way of encouraging economic recovery.

## **2 Why Did the Dog Not Bark?**

The picture that emerges from the examination of government actions is one of several small changes in trade policy that are often limited to individual products. Most of these have been in developing countries and have probably not had a major impact on trade. The industrial countries have not reacted in a protectionist way: apart from the quasi-automatic reintroduction of cereal tariffs and dairy export subsidies by the EU (a reaction to weakening world market conditions) there has been, to date, no widespread surge in new agricultural protection at or inside the border. The combination of the commodity boom that preceded

(though did not cause) the economic bust and the restraints under the WTO has allowed governments to resist such temptations.<sup>5</sup>

Three possible explanations come to mind. First, government policies toward agriculture may have changed fundamentally: the dog itself may have modified its behaviour. If this is the case, the reasons certainly demand an explanation and the emergence of agriculture from the policy dog-house should be welcomed. A second explanation may be that there has been no reason to intervene in agricultural markets on this occasion: the dog may have had nothing to bark about. This argument is plausible in that agricultural prices had been very high in 2007-08 and governments may have decided that no financial intervention in the sector was warranted. But this is to argue that the lack of response was due to a temporary event. Vigilance would still be warranted if prices weaken further and costs stay high. The third explanation is that the interventions have been below the radar: the dog was barking but the sound was drowned out by other louder noises at the time. If this were the case then there could be some useful policy lessons even if the government actions never made the headlines.

The argument that agricultural policy has undergone a fundamental change is attractive. Farm policy in industrial countries began to change in the mid 1980s, with a noticeable shift away from the support of commodity prices toward direct payments to farmers that interfered somewhat less with the price signals from the market. This in turn created a new “political economy” of the rationale for and distribution of the direct payments, and new actors emerged on the scene to press the case for environmental and other objectives to be included as conditions for receiving the funds. Food safety concerns brought other actors onto the stage and further diluted the power of commodity interests. An awakened interest in food quality offered farmers an alternative way to earn a living: produce for the market and not for the government stockpile.

The UR Agreement on Agriculture introduced disciplines on agricultural policies and border measures that supported such policies. The rules have been generally effective, eliminating most non-tariff import measures such as variable levies and quotas (though at the cost of introducing tariff rate quotas, which are proving difficult to remove) and disciplining both domestic and export subsidies. The shift toward direct payments that are more or less decoupled from production has been encouraged by the subsidy disciplines, as domestic support that is not connected to current price and output has not been subject to reduction under the Agreement on Agriculture. The changing policy paradigm, promoted by academic research and debates in international bodies such as the WTO and the OECD, has also contributed to a tendency to reduce policies that strongly distort markets and trade. Export subsidies have been reduced on schedule and now are limited to a few products. The slow-

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<sup>5</sup> The fact that the WTO talks are still ongoing may also have made countries hesitate in using trade measures in agriculture that would have weakened their position at the negotiating table.

moving Doha Round is designed, in the context of agriculture, to tighten these disciplines with significant cuts in tariffs, elimination of export subsidies and drastic reductions in the ceilings for trade-distorting domestic support.

The influence of agriculture has indeed declined in the past couple of decades. Though the US Farm Bill in 2008 was seen as a victory for those that wanted to retain the core programs for corn, wheat, soybeans, rice and cotton, the process exposed a polarization of views that may suggest that change could come in the next few years. The EU has a core group of member states that support the CAP, but the Commission has skilfully continued the process of reform by finding winning coalitions on key topics. But whether this weakening of the political support for “traditional” farm programs presents an explanation for the lack of a protectionist reaction to the economic slowdown is not so clear.

In the absence of fully convincing evidence that the underlying politics of agricultural support has changed fundamentally, the more plausible argument is that the farm sector in the industrial countries has not been badly impacted by the economic crisis. The commodity price boom that preceded the financial collapse had provided farmers with a cushion. Land prices did not collapse with other forms of real estate. Indeed, the commodity price spike itself caused many governments to “protect” consumers by restricting exports at the expense of some short term profits by farmers. As prices eased, farmers benefited from the relaxation of these restrictions. Moreover, prices are still above historical levels and so political pressure for farm rescue packages is muted. A major economic reason behind the relative resilience of agriculture in times of economic recession is the fact that income elasticities of the demand for food and other agricultural products are small. As incomes decline, the demand for food shrinks only marginally. The farm sector is, therefore, much less affected by an economic slowdown than other parts of the economy: in agriculture governments have less reason to provide protection against recession than in other sectors of the economy.

What of the argument that there has indeed been government activity involving agriculture, though the scale of that activity has been dwarfed by measures taken in other sectors? There may well be some merit in that explanation. If the evidence provided above, based on the lists of policy action that have become available so far, is reasonably comprehensive then it appears to be the case that the scope and intensity of protectionist measures taken in agriculture in recent months has indeed been relatively limited.

### **3 Policy Lessons**

What policy lessons can one draw from this evidence? The fact that agricultural protectionism seems relatively subdued at the moment should not be taken as conclusive

evidence that it will not re-emerge. The volume of agricultural trade is shrinking along with that in other sectors. If the recession continues or intensifies, significant pressures will undoubtedly arise for further action to assist agriculture. The reaction of the major developing countries could hold the key. Any return to tighter import restrictions in the emerging markets could produce a backlash in the industrial countries. And the losers will be smaller countries whose dependence on trade is the greatest.

However, a suitable policy instrument is at hand. The list of actions taken by governments in response to the economic crisis emphasizes the prime importance of completing the Doha Round. A conclusion of the negotiations based on the draft modalities under consideration in December 2008 would make it much more difficult for countries in the future to increase tariffs, subsidize exports or support agriculture in ways that impact trade flows. The structure of rules is largely in place and seems to have held up well under the strain: taking the next step beyond the Uruguay Round in reducing tariff levels and subsidy amounts, a step that would be larger than the first one agreed under the Agreement on Agriculture, would be invaluable to strengthen agricultural trade. But the case would be made even stronger if the somewhat weak provisions in the current draft for disciplining export restrictions were strengthened. For import-dependent countries to agree to limit their own policy space in terms of import barriers for farm products it would seem desirable to offer them comparable restraints on export taxes and bans. Such an addition could sweeten the deal that is tantalisingly close to agreement.

*Ad hoc* efforts to make governments agree to avoid protectionist responses to the economic recession, such as debates on trade policies in the G20 Summits, have not so far yielded any firm and legally binding commitments. It is certainly worth leaders' while to continue such efforts. But eventually a swift conclusion of the Doha Round, establishing new formal bindings of lower tariffs and subsidy levels in agriculture that are enforceable in the WTO, would appear to establish the most effective constraint on what otherwise might become an irresistible temptation for the agricultural policy dog to begin barking again.

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**Annex Table: Policy Action Taken in the Food and Agriculture Sector Since Fall 2008<sup>6</sup>**

Country/ Member State	Measure	Date	Source	Comment
<b>1. Border measures in favour of domestic producers</b>				
Argentina	Elimination of export taxes (set at 5% in August 2006) for 35 HS tariff lines (Codes 0401; 0402; 0403; 0404; 0405; 0406; and 1901.90.90) "dairy products", as from 1 January 2009.	6 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Belarus	Abolition of the list of "non-critical" imports. These lists included 16 food and 15 non-food items that would have easier access by Russian firms. Proposed imposition of higher duty on a series of goods, excluding goods made in Russia	3 March 2009	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
Brazil	Inclusion of the meat sector in the drawback programme (exception of federal taxes (9.5%) on the purchase of national inputs for exportable products)	10 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
China	Import ban on Irish pork.	December 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
China	Elimination of lower Interim Import Tariffs Rates on soybean oil-cake, pork, and neem oil, and resumption of normal MFN rates.	1 January 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
China	Cancellation of export licensing administration on silk warm cocoon, and certain silk products.	1 January 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Chinese Taipei	Imposition of a volume-based special safeguard for dried day lilies, from 9 October 2008 to 31 December 2008.	18 November 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Chinese Taipei	Imposition of a volume-based special safeguard for other liquid milk, from 3 December 2008 to 31 December 2008.	6 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
EC	Anti-dumping duties imposed on preserved fruits from China	December 2008	Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009)	
EC	Provisional anti-dumping duties (ranging from €3.6 (US\$31) to €208.2 (US\$272) per tonne net) on imports of "biodiesel" (CN 3824 90 91; ex 3824 90 97; ex 2710 19 41; ex 1516 20 98; ex 1518 00 91; ex 1518 00 99) originating in the United States, to be effective as from 12 March 2009; and for a maximum period of six months.	11 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
EC	Provisional countervailing duties (ranging from €11.2 (US\$275) to €37 (US\$309) per tonne net) on imports of "biodiesel" (CN 3824 90 91; ex 3824 90 97; ex 2710 19 41; ex 1516 20 98; ex 1518 00 91; ex 1518 00 99) originating in the United States, to be effective as from 12 March 2009; and for a maximum period of four months.	11 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Ecuador	Increased tariffs for imported goods including candy and butter.	27 November 2008	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
Ecuador	Tariff increases on 630 tariff lines (accounting for 8.7% of total lines, covering a wide range of goods, with a view to restore balance-of-payments. (Article XVIII.B of GATT 1994). These measures are intended to be temporary and valid for one year.	Effective as of 22 January 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source
Egypt	Anti-dumping duties on imports of white sugar (imposed in January 2009).	22 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
India	Removal of export duty and reduction of	20 January 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	

<sup>6</sup> In this table, the description of measures reported in the WTO and World Bank lists is taken directly from those lists.

Country/ Member State	Measure	Date	Source	Comment
	minimum export price for premium Basmati rice.			
India	Imposition of 20% duty on imported soybean oils	24 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
India	Export incentives for a variety of exporters, and specific export incentives for textile and leather products.	26 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source
Indonesia	Eliminated export duties on crude palm oil and relax export market regulations to help boost exports.	17 December 2008	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
Indonesia	New licensing, reporting, and pre-shipment inspection requirements on over 500 goods (including food and beverages).	1 January 2009 and 1 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Indonesia	the government has revised import duties on 35 product classifications, including on raw materials for the beverage and chemical industries, (duties reduced) as well as on processed goods for the beverage industry (duties increased)	21 February 2009	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
Japan	Special Safeguard measures (SSG) on food preparations of flour, meal or starch, and tubers of konnyaku (from 1 February to 31 March 2009).	13 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Mexico	Suspension of preferential tariff treatment, arising from NAFTA, on 89 tariff lines of goods originating from the United States. The World Bank list states that this measure "includes products ranging from fruit and wine to washing machines".	19 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source.
Russian Federation	Reduction of meat tariff quotas and increase of non-quota rates for pork (from 60% to 75%) and poultry (from 60% to 95%), (measure announced in November 2007, but effective as from 1 January 2009).	1 November 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Russian Federation	Temporary increase of import tariffs (for nine months) on a number of products such as butter and certain types of dairy products (by €0.13 up to €0.35/kg (US\$0.2- US\$0.5)); milk and dairy cream (by 5% up to 20%); and rice and milling products (by €0.16 up to €0.23/kg (US\$0.2-US\$0.3)).	6 November 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Russian Federation	Import ban on pork on supplies from several US facilities which do not comply with technical requirements.	15 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Russian Federation	Increase of export duties on hides, skins and wet-bleu leather postponed, not repealed.	24 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
South Korea	Imposition of a 4.2 percent tariff rate on imported flour. The item used to be free of tariffs.	26 February 2009	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
Turkey	Import tariff increase on a number of products such as wheat and meslin, buckwheat, rye, barley and oats, unprepared cereal straw and husks (from 50% to 80%); and dried apricots, prunes, apples (from 41% to 43.2%).	31 December 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Ukraine	Import duty surcharges up to 13%, except for "non-critical imports" for a term of up to six months, with a view to restore balance-of-payments (Article XII of GATT 1994).  The World Bank list states that on 24 March 2009 "Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has decided to cancel a 13% extra duty on the import of a number of goods, apart from cars and refrigerators. The law was signed by the	As from 7 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source. The World Bank list states that "products that fall under 'non-critical import' category include meat and miscellaneous husbandry products, and spirits.

Country/ Member State	Measure	Date	Source	Comment
United States	president, published in the government newspaper on February 24th 2009, and was supposed to come into effect 10 days after.” Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 (H.R. 1105) establishing that "none of the funds made available in this Act may be used to establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products to be imported into the United States from the People's Republic of China". This is reportedly in response to food safety concerns, and is intended to allow time for USDA officials to ensure that imported poultry from China is safe.	11 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Uzbekistan	<i>De facto</i> limitation on imports of consumer goods via restricted access to foreign exchange. Possible further delays of conversion for imported consumer goods.	24 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source
Vietnam	Announcement of easing of rice export rules including waiving a floor price until early next year and to provide more soft loans for exporters to buy paddy to deal with slowing foreign demand, falling prices and mounting stocks	28 October 2008	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009	
<b>2. Application of counter-cyclical measures</b>				
EC	Reintroduction of customs duties on imports of certain cereals (CN Codes: 1001 90 99; 1001 10; 1002 00 00; 1003 00; 1005 90 00; 1007 00 90; 1008 10 00; 1008 20 00) for the 2008/09 marketing year. Since January 2008, tariffs for cereals were suspended (Commission Regulation No. 608/2008 of 26 June 2008).	22 October 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
EC	Reintroduction of export refunds for butter, cheese and whole and skim milk powder (as of 19 January 2009). Resumption of market interventions to buy butter and skim milk powder from 1 March 2009.	22 January 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
<b>3. Explicit action in favour of domestic consumers or other users</b>				
Ecuador	Import tariff reductions on 3,267 tariff lines covering products such as: raw materials (from 7.6% to 3.8%) not locally produced.	December 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
India	Extension and increase of export taxes on hides, skins and wet-blue leather. Import license requirement limiting imports to genuine end user business with back-to-back export orders.	24 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
India	Abolished the 20 percent import duty levied on crude, degummed, soybean oil imposed on 18 November 2008, bringing it on the same level as other crude vegetable oils such as palm, sunflower and rapeseed.	11 April 2009	World Bank Fact Sheet: G20 Countries: Actions on Trade since April 2, 2009 (updated on April 23, 2009)	
India	Abolished the import duty on raw and white varieties of sugar. The Finance ministry will soon notify the removal of the 60 percent tax. The duty exemption is valid until July 31.	13 April 2009	World Bank Fact Sheet: G20 Countries: Actions on Trade since April 2, 2009 (updated on April 23, 2009)	
Indonesia	New regulation stipulating that exports of crude palm oil, coffee, rubber, and cocoa with an export value exceeding US\$1 million must be supported by letters of credit issued by domestic banks.	5 March 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Japan	Lifted the ban on Chilean pork, which was introduced last year after detecting dioxin in the pork last year.	17 April 2009	World Bank Fact Sheet: G20 Countries: Actions on Trade since April 2, 2009 (updated on April 23, 2009)	

Country/ Member State	Measure	Date	Source	Comment
Philippines	Tariff reduction on wheat and meslin to 0% for a period of six months, effective from 22 December 2008.	7 November 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Philippines	Reduction of import tariffs on several products, mainly not locally produced. Reduction of MFN tariffs from 3% to 1% on dried distillers grain soluble and soybean meal.	10 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
South Korea	South Korea agreed to open up to U.S. beef imports after Washington pledged to raise safety standards, boosting prospects for a sweeping trade deal ahead of a summit between leaders of the allies later in the day	18 April 2009	World Bank Fact Sheet: G20 Countries: Actions on Trade since April 2, 2009 (updated on April 23, 2009)	
Tunisia	Reduction of customs duties under economic stimulus plan.	23 December 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source
Kazakhstan	Reduction of import tariffs on equipment and raw materials that are not locally produced (but with increase of import tariffs on finished goods, competing with local production.)	28 December 2008	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	Coverage of agriculture not specified in source.
<b>4. Stimulus programmes targeting agriculture</b>				
Belgium	Flemish region brings forward an EUR 15.5 million aid package for dairy farmers	March 2009	Press reports	
Brazil	Provisions to increase supply of rural credit		Press reports	
Canada	Provincial support program of the Government of Saskatchewan, CAD71 million, for cattle and hog producers	February 2009	Press reports	
China	Government to increase agricultural subsidies by 120 billion yuan, increasing the total amount envisaged in 2009 to 220 billion yuan. This is within the amount permitted under China's WTO obligations. Bridges reports that "China's response to the global financial crisis, a stimulus package worth US\$ 585 billion over two years, includes a five-fold increase in spending on agriculture, boosting it from US\$18 billion to US\$106 billion. The government is expected to spend nearly US\$ 26 billion to stock commodities such as grains and edible oils."	2 February 2009	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1', April 21 2009 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol 13 no 9, 11 March 2009	
EU	Extra expenditure of around EUR 1 billion for rural development under the EU economic recovery plan	January 2009	Press reports	
France	EUR 250 million programme of income support, debt relief and fuel rebates for farmers	November 2008	Press reports	
India	Increase in the Minimum Support Price for cotton paid to local farmers.	14 February 2009	WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1	
Indonesia	National action plan, including subsidized fertilizers, farm credits with subsidized interest, guaranteed farm gate price, domestic food stocks	December 2008	Press reports	
Poland	Easing of credit for agriculture		Press reports	
Russia	Various measures improving credit conditions for agriculture	January 2009	Press reports	
Spain	Programme for farms and agro-food businesses to facilitate access to subsidised credit	January 2009	Press reports	
Sri Lanka	Tea growers to be granted a fertiliser subsidy of up to Rs. 30 billion	22 January 2009	World Bank, International Trade Department, 'Trade-Related Measures Taken Since October 1' April 21, 2009	

