Monitoring European Integration Volume 12 - 'Built To Last: A Political Architecture For Europe'
Authors: Erik Berglöf (SITE, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR), Barry Eichengreen (University of California at Berkeley and CEPR), Gérard Roland (University of California at Berkeley and CEPR), Guido Tabellini (University of Bocconi and CEPR) and Charles Wyplosz (Graduate Institute for International Studies and CEPR)
The European Constitutional Convention faces a daunting task in its final phase: to draft the most appropriate Constitution for the EU while avoiding lowest-common-denominator solutions. A new Report in CEPR’s series, Monitoring European Integration (MEI) entitled 'Built to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe', proposes a method for drafting the Constitution, inspired by economic principles.
The authors of this CEPR Report suggest that European economic integration has preceded the construction of the necessary political substructure, with the implication that further economic progress risks being hampered unless reforms are made. Moreover, economic integration and changes in the rest of the world have now increased the benefits of centralizing some essential functions of government at the European level, such as internal and external security and foreign policy, while creating a case for decentralizing others. But the inadequate legitimacy, accountability, and efficiency of Europe’s political institutions prevent the necessary reorganization. Such reforms might affect both the form of the EU governmental institutions, as well as the allocation of responsibilities between the EU bodies and the member states. The great contribution of this Report is to provide a straightforward, analytical framework for evaluating the options for reform, taking into account both political considerations and the relevant economic theory.
The authors apply their framework to the question of which tasks are more appropriately centralized at the EU level and which are better left to national governments. Importantly, their work suggests that there is no uniform response: in some cases powers should be transferred to the EU, in others powers that are currently partially or totally centralized should be returned to nation states. But any further centralization of power is likely to meet fierce popular resistance, unless the democratic accountability of EU institutions is enhanced, and particularly that of the Commission. To this end, the Report compares the two main models of democratic governance – parliamentary and presidential – using a structured set of criteria, and asks which one would best suit the EU in the long run.
'Built to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe', argues for an integrated set of reforms. The authors point out that there will not be another opportunity to draft a Constitutional Treaty for the EU for many years to come. This makes it essential for the Convention to take into consideration what the EU will be like in the distant future, and to pave the way for a gradual evolution of its institutions to suit the long run needs. In the long run, a presidential system of governance is likely to be best adapted to Europe’s characteristics and needs – and specifically to the need to expand the competency of the EU in the areas of internal and external security. In a full-blown presidential system, the Commission would have well-defined executive powers, specified by the Council. Its President would be directly elected by the citizens of Europe and would also chair the European Council. In the short run, however, a presidential system is not politically feasible.
A currently popular compromise proposes that the European Parliament elect the Commission President. But this means a parliamentary system. Once in place, this arrangement would preclude a future evolution towards a presidential system. For this reason, Built to Last proposes that an evolutionary strategy is the safer option. A short run compromise would be to have the Commission president elected by a college of country representatives appointed by national parliaments. The Council’s influence on the Commission can be guaranteed through checks and balances. This solution would preserve the option of moving to a fully-fledged presidential model, complete with direct elections sometime in the future, while providing enhanced democratic legitimacy in the meantime. The Constitution should come into effect once it is approved by a qualified majority of member states. While member states that reject it should have the option of a more limited type of mainly economic association.
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