European Economic Perspectives 23

So Far, So Good…

An Update to Monitoring the European Central Bank (MECB)

Since the launch of the euro in January, the ECB’s policies have proved remarkably pragmatic and the Bank has served as an important force for stability in Europe, the latest MECB Update concludes. In particular, the ECB responded sensibly, both to the upturn in unemployment in the large EU economies and to the decline in the value of the euro – in the first case by cutting interest rates and in the second by doing nothing.

Average inflation in Euroland countries fell from 1.6% in 1997 to 1.1% in 1998, largely because of lower energy prices. Real GDP growth increased from 2.5% in 1997 to 3.0% in 1998. This was little cause for optimism, however, given the size of the adverse global shock in 1998. The coordinated reduction of interest rates in December 1998 was, therefore, a shrewd move. It signalled the de facto existence of monetary union ahead of its de jure start-up. More importantly, it dispelled fears that the ESCB might be unable to respond to worsening macroeconomic conditions.

Early statements by President Duisenberg and other Council members indicated that the ECB wanted to avoid interest rate activism. For three months, the ECB maintained the interest rate at 3% despite increasing evidence that the slowdown was indeed materializing – particularly in Germany and Italy, which together constitute half of Euroland’s GDP. From the outset, however, there have been asymmetries: GDP has been growing strongly in Spain and Portugal and especially in Ireland.

On 8 April 1999, the ECB cut the interest rate to 2.5%, a further step in an already long period of decline. Nominal interest rates are now at their lowest point this decade and real interest rates are not high in historical perspective. But the April decision to cut interest rates was not uncontroversial. The move thus provides an early signal about the ECB’s preferences. Three lessons can be drawn, according to the MECB authors:

• First, while the ECB had repeatedly stated that it cannot do much to deal with unemployment, it clearly responded to the risk of a cyclical increase in some countries. It thus demonstrated that in the absence of any inflationary pressure, it can support counter-cyclical policies rather than hide behind its frequently stated goal of medium-term price stability.

• Second, the decision was taken at a time when the euro was declining against the dollar. The ECB thus indicated that it is prepared to treat the exchange rate with benign neglect. Greater benign neglect of the external exchange rate may, of course, be a perfectly appropriate response to monetary union since Euroland is much less open to external trade than were its individual members. Yet discussions of ECB policy within Euroland countries are still dominated by the small open-economy perspective, which is, the MECB Update stresses, now clearly inappropriate. In any case, it was not the euro that declined but the dollar that was strengthening, owing to the continuing remarkable performance of the US economy. So the ECB should not be criticized for apparently neglecting the decline of the external value of the euro.

• Third, although the ECB has vowed not to look at national situations, the interest rate cut is easier to understand in light of the economic situation in the weaker member countries rather than in light of the aggregate data in Euroland.

These three messages show that the monetary strategy of the ECB is evolving, maturing and gradually stepping out of the shadow of the Bundesbank. The ECB could have opted for a narrower interpretation of its mandate, repeating the argument that growth and unemployment are the concerns of national authorities. That would have been the easy way. By eschewing this approach, the ECB has demonstrated that it will follow a more balanced approach.

The ECB has worked hard to resolve the early problems of being central banker to Euroland. As emphasized in the inaugural MECB report published in the autumn of 1998, time was not on its side, global conditions were less favourable than might have been the case, and reconciling disparate interests and traditions is never easy. The ECB should be congratulated both for avoiding some of the dogmatic positions into which it might easily have fallen, and for its continuing openness to ideas and discussion.

The first MECB Report, published in October 1998, identified many challenges for the ECB. The Update does not discuss them all in detail, but argues that it is useful to keep score and take stock. At the time of the issue of the ECB’s first Annual Report in April 1999, the MECB team’s assessment can be summarized as follows:

Problems resolved:

• Price stability defined
• Benign neglect of exchange rates largely established
• Monetary policy already dedicated to wider objectives than mere pursuit of price stability
• Importance of banking supervision recognized
• European mode of thinking within the Council established
• Early credibility with financial markets
• Adequate reporting of Euro-aggregate numbers
• Establishment of a smoothly working payments system

Challenges remaining:

• Transparency still inadequate
• Monetary policy strategy still too vague
• Monetary actions need to match the declared strategy
• Inflation forecasts and their relevance need to be clearly discussed
• Differences across regions and their relevance need to be assessed
• Centralization of authority within ESCB needs to progress further
• Further coordination with supervisory bodies is desirable
• The linkages between the various payments systems need to work more smoothly

The full text of MECB Update is available from CEPR. The first full report was published by CEPR in October 1998: ‘The ECB: Safe at Any Speed? Monitoring the European Central Bank No.1’ by David Begg, Paul De Grauwe, Francesco Giavazzi, Harald Uhlig and Charles Wyplosz.

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