# Social Media and News Exposure


CEPR Media Plurality Webinar

Ro'ee Levy

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## More news consumed through social media


Which, if any, of the following have you used in the last week as a source of news? (Reuters 2023)



## More news consumed through social media (2)

Which of these was the main way in which you came across news in the last week?

## PROPORTION THAT SAY EACH IS THEIR MAIN WAY OF GETTING NEWS ONLINE (2018–2023) – ALL MARKETS




Source: Data from 36-46 markets, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2023

## Plan for today

- Literature on social media news consumption
  - Algorithms
  - Echo chambers
- Discussion mostly based on: Guy Aridor, Rafael Jiménez Durán, Ro'ee Levy and Lena Song - The Economics of Social Media (R&R, Journal of Economic Literature)

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- Dramatic increase in number of papers



## Social media and news consumption

#### Production

- Why is toxic content shared on social media?
- How can we decrease misinformation?
- How does social media affect the type of news produced, online and offline?


#### Distribution

- Are social network characterized by homophily?
- How do algorithms affect news distribution?
- Are individuals in online echo chambers?

#### Consumption

 How does social media affect downstream political outcomes? Protest, polarization, political participation, hate crime

Figure 2.: Flow of content



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
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Figure 2.: Flow of content



- Promote low-quality news
- Promote like-minded news
- Radicalize users by driving them down rabbit holes (YouTube)
- Algorithms biased, e.g., against conservatives

- Promote low-quality news Mixed evidence
  - Facebook's algorithm doubles the amount of uncivil content (Guess et al., 2023)
  - However, Facebook also decreases untrustworthy content (Guess et al., 2023)
- Promote like-minded news
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
- Promote low-quality news Mixed evidence
- Promote like-minded news Strong/mixed evidence
  - More like-minded news in actual feed (Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2023)
  - More exposure to like-minded pages liked (Levy, 2021)
- Radicalize users by driving them down rabbit holes (YouTube)
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- Promote low-quality news Mixed evidence
- Promote like-minded news Strong/mixed evidence
- Radicalize users by driving them down rabbit holes (YouTube) No/weak evidence
  - Videos do not become more extreme within sessions (Hosseinmardi et al., 2021)
  - Recommendations do not substantially shift toward like-minded content (Brown et al., 2022)
  - Extreme videos not recommended to most people (Chen et al., 2023)
- Algorithms biased, e.g., against conservatives

- Promote low-quality news Mixed evidence
- Promote like-minded news Strong/mixed evidence
- Radicalize users by driving them down rabbit holes (YouTube) No/weak evidence
- Algorithms biased, e.g., against conservatives No/weak evidence
  - Twitter's algorithm amplified the political right more than the political left (Huszar et al., 2022)
  - YouTube recommendations slightly nudge users toward conservative videos (Brown et al., 2022)
  - However, Facebook flags more conservative content as misinformation (Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2023)

## Future research: algorithms

- New platforms are different and barely studied
  - Distribution of content: do not rely on social networks
  - Content: videos instead of text, less news, but recently increasing
  - Audience: much younger




(CEPR, NBER, and general interst journal in economics, 2000-2022 data, Aridor et al. (2024)

• How will this affect the news people are exposed to?

- Segregation online is not dramatic though it may be increasing
- Segregation is higher on social media
- Social media increases like-minded exposure, but also provides exposure to other news
- Channels: algorithms, selective exposure, following pages or elite accounts

- Segregation online is not dramatic though it may be increasing
  - In 2009, segregation not dramatic or higher than offline network (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011)



- Segregation increased substantially by 2016 (Peterson et al., 2021)
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- Segregation online is not dramatic though it may be increasing
- Segregation is higher on social media
  - Segregation on social media substantially higher than other online content 20%-300% (Peterson et al., 2021; Levy, 2021; Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2023)
    - $\bullet$  Isolation sites not visited through FB  $\approx$  national newspaper or volunatry associations
    - $\bullet$  Isolation sites visited through FB  $\approx$  family members
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  - ullet Higher segregation, yet share of opposing articles 2-3% o 5-8% (Flaxman et al., 2016)
  - Median FB user: 50% like-minded sources, 10% cross-cutting, 40% neither (Nyhan et al., 2023)
- Channels: algorithms, selective exposure, following pages or elite accounts

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  - Reddit users comment on negative news about opposing candidates (D'Amico and Tabellini, 2022)
  - FB segregation higher among pages followed compared to friends (Levy, 2021; Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2023)

# Thank You!

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